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Deterring the Formation of the Attorney-Client
Relationship: Disclosure of Client Identity,
Payment of Fees, and Communications
by Fiduciaries
DANIEL J. CAPRA*
In recent months, state and federal courts have, consistent with well-estab-
lished but little-investigated principles, limited the scope of the attorney-cli-
ent privilege.' On the federal level, the Tax Reform Act of 1984 requires
people to report the receipt of cash payments in excess of $10,000.2 The
Internal Revenue Service has promulgated a Form 8300 for this purpose and
is attempting by way of summonses to compel attorneys who submit I.R.S.
8300 Forms to disclose the names of clients who have paid their fees in cash
amounts over $10,000. 3 An IRS commissioner has stated that the govern-
ment intends to use the 8300 report as "another weapon in fighting the war
on drugs and in combatting organized crime across the board."14 In contrast,
the President of the American Bar Association has called the serving of
I.R.S. summonses "an unmitigated attack on the sanctity enjoyed by all citi-
* Professor of Law, Fordham University Law School.
1. Under federal practice, the state law of privilege applies where state law provides the rule of
decision. FED. R. EvID. 501. Where federal law supplies the rule of decision, the attorney-client
privilege is determined by the federal common law, as it develops in the light of reason and experi-
ence. Thus, the attorney-client privilege is not codified under federal law. See Upjohn Co. v. United
States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (summarizing federal case law on the privilege). Generally speak-
ing, however, the federal courts have adopted the famous Wigmore definition of the attorey-client
privilege: the privilege applies to a statement by the client to an attorney or his agents, where the
client is seeking legal advice, and the communication is intended to be confidential. See, e.g., In re
Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 731 F.2d 1032, 1036 (2d Cir. 1984) (implicitly adopting lan-
guage of the Wigmore test); See generally, Capra, The Federal Law of Privileges, 16 LITIGATION 32
(1989) (for a discussion of common law privileges).
In New York, the attorney-client privilege is codified by CPLR 4503, which protects a "confiden-
tial communication made between the attorney or his employee and the client in the course of
professional employment." N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 4503 (McKinney Supp. 1990). CPLR 4503
has been interpreted as a codification of the Wigmore test. See J. WEINSTEIN, H. KORN & A.
MILLER, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE 45-92.1 (1989) (citing to 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§§ 2290-2393 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961)).
2. 26 U.S.C. § 60501 (1988).
3. Under 26 U.S.C. § 60501, the I.R.S. drafted regulations which require all persons "engaged in
a trade and business," including attorneys, to report cash received in excess of $10,000 on a Form
8300. In addition to the name of the payer, the regulations also require disclosure of the payer's
address, date of birth, social security number, and business, profession or occupation.
4. Fricker, US. Targets Lawyers, A.B.A. J., May 1990, at 18-19 (quoting I.R.S. Commissioner
Fred T. Goldberg, Jr.).
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zens to seek legal assistance in confidence." '5 Attorneys have in the past filled
out the 8300 Forms, but have left blank the name of the client, on the ground
that supplying the name would disclose information which could be adverse
to the client, to wit: that the client thought he had a legal problem, sought
legal advice for it, and paid in cash. Currently, the I.R.S. is proceeding with a
number of Form 8300 test cases, in which I.R.S. summonses have been
served for the missing information.6 One such case, United States v. Fis-
chetti,7 resulted in a victory for the I.R.S. in the Southern District of New
York. The I.R.S. took the position that the name of the client is not pro-
tected by the attorney-client privilege, and therefore that the I.R.S. has an
absolute right to the information."
In an unpublished ruling, Judge Broderick of the Southern District of New
York held that two New York criminal defense firms were required to supply
the names of clients on the Form 8300s filed with the I.R.S.9 Judge Broder-
ick stayed enforcement of the summonses pending appeal, and suggested that
the law firms and the I.R.S. work together to develop guidelines for client
disclosure. The Judge stated that there might be "special circumstances" in
5. IRS Serves Summonses on Attorneys for Client Transaction Information, 46 CRIM. L. RI'TR.
(BNA) 1503-04 (Mar. 14, 1990) (quoting American Bar Association President L. Stanley Chauvin).
6. See N.Y.L.J., Mar. 8, 1990, at 1, col. 2:
The Internal Revenue Service, hoping to expose major drug figures, has served sum-
monses on criminal defense attorneys around the country, demanding the names of clients
who paid cash for fees exceeding $ 10,000.... One attorney served said an IRS agent told
him 900 attorneys were to receive summonses. Neal Sonnett of Miami, president of the
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, predicted "hundreds of attorneys will
go to jail" rather than comply.
See generally Kenderline, The Internal Revenue Service Summons to Produce Documents: Powers,
Procedures, and Taxpayer Defenses, 64 MINN. L. REV. 73 (1979) (treating extensively the power of
the I.R.S. to compel production of documentary evidence by summons).
7. No. M-18-304 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 1990).
8. Federal courts have held that they have the authority to impose reasonable conditions on
enforcement of an I.R.S. summons, if unlimited enforcement would be unfair or tantamount to
abuse of process. See, e.g., United States v. Rockwell Int'l, 897 F.2d 1255, 1261 (3rd Cir. 1990)
(citing cases upholding the authority to enforce). But see United States v. Barrett, 837 F.2d 1341
(5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3264 (1989) (court has no power to impose conditional
enforcement of I.R.S. summonses). In United States v. Zolin, 109 S. Ct. 2619 (1989), an equally
divided Supreme Court upheld a Ninth Circuit ruling that I.R.S. summonses could be enforced
conditionally to protect against abuse of the judicial process. Under the court's ruling, however,
even if information sought by the I.R.S. is not privileged, a court can impose limitations on disclo-
sure, such as refusing a blanket enforcement of summons on all defense attorneys.
In addition, 26 U.S.C § 7602(c) authorizes the quashing of an I.R.S. summons if the I.R.S. has
referred the matter under investigation to the Justice Department for criminal prosecution. But the
statute bars the use of the summons procedure only after the decision to prosecute or convene a
grand jury has been made. 26 U.S.C. § 7602(c)(2)(i) (1988). Thus, a proper purpose for an I.R.S.
summons is to determine whether a person should be recommended to the Justice Department for
prosecution.
9. Fricker, supra note 4 at 18.
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other cases when the privilege would apply, but did not specify what those
special circumstances might be.10
On the state level, the New York Court of Appeals recently held in Hoopes
v. Carota that: 1) the attorney-client privilege does not generally protect in-
formation concerning the attorney-client relationship itself, such as fee pay-
ments and the fact of consultation; and 2) beneficiaries should have some
right of access to confidential communications between their fiduciary and an
attorney. I
The rulings in these cases are not unprecedented. It has been often held
that the attorney-client privilege does not apply to the incidents of represen-
tation such as the name of the client, the fact of consultation, or the fee
payment. It is also well-accepted that a fiduciary cannot generally shield his
or her communications with an attorney from those whom the fiduciary os-
tensibly represents. Yet these cases are examples of the courts' failure to
recognize the importance of the attorney-client relationship and the attor-
ney's duty of zealous representation. If the attorney is forced to give infor-
mation detrimental to the client's interest, the attorney-client relationship
will only suffer. In the long run, there will be a detrimental chilling effect on
the attorney, especially the criminal defense attorney who is put in the unten-
able position of having to face disqualification for giving evidence against the
client. Indeed, the chilling effect will run even to the formation of the attor-
ney-client relationship: what client will seek advice if the very seeking of that
advice can be used against him? What fiduciary will seek advice if the fiduci-
ary's communications can be disclosed to a possible adversary?
It is one thing if the client is using the attorney to further a plan of crime
and fraud. Such a relationship should be deterred, whether or not the attor-
ney is aware of the client's motivations. But it is another thing if a client is
seeking legal advice for permissible purposes, which nonetheless could result
in adverse consequences if disclosed. In such circumstances, disclosure de-
ters the formation of the attorney-client relationship, imposes an ethical di-
lemma on attorneys who may be forced to give adverse information against
the client, and skews the adversary system through ad hoc disqualification.
These costs far outweigh whatever gains that disclosure of client information
brings to the search for truth.
This article describes ethical issues governing the attorney-client relation-
ship other than the privilege in order to highlight the nature of the relation-
ship. It then analyses how that relationship is being undermined by
focussing on the current state of the law of the attorney-client privilege as it
10. Brodsky, An Attorney's Obligation to Identify Clients Who Pay Cash Fees, N.Y.L.J., May 29,
1990, at 1, col. 3. Thus, the judge refused to grant the government's request for a sweeping order
which would have precluded refusals to comply in future cases by other attorneys.
11. 74 N.Y.2d 716, 543 N.E.2d 73, 544 N.Y.S.2d 808 (1989).
1990]
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relates to disclosure of clients' names and consultations by fiduciaries. It will
discuss the ethical problems created by required disclosure, and will advocate
a uniform approach to protect this information unless it is being used to
further a crime or fraud.
I. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS BEYOND THE PRIVILEGE
Even if the privilege is inapplicable, there may still be some limited protec-
tion for attorneys subject to demands for client information. The privilege is
only one aspect of the trust and confidence that is necessary for an effective
attorney-client relationship. The attorney's ethical obligation to protect
against disclosure of adverse client information extends beyond the eviden-
tiary privilege.12 This obligation is based on the proposition that the trust
and confidence which is the foundation of the attorney-client relationship do
not rest solely on the privilege, but also on the expectation that the attorney
has a duty of loyalty and will represent the client's interests in every appro-
priate way. It is hardly conducive to trust and confidence if the attorney is
forced to give damaging information about his client to the government. 13
Moreover, forcing the attorney to become a witness against the client may
require the attorney to disqualify himself, with an obvious deleterious effect
on the attorney-client relationship. 14 Finally, a prosecutor's subpoena of de-
fense counsel can have a significant chilling effect on the lawyer and on the
defense bar as a whole. In one study, 14% of the members of the National
12. See N.Y. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 4-101(A) (an attorney must keep
client "secrets," defined as "information gained in the professional relationship which the client has
requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would likely be
detrimental to the client."). Thus, the term "secret" includes much information which is not pro-
tected by the evidentiary attorney-client privilege. See also Proposed Amendments to the Lawyer's
Code of Professional Responsibility, 42 THE RECORD OF THE A. OF THE B. OF THE CITY OF NEW
YORK 323, 329 (1987) (disagreeing with State Bar Committee's proposal to excuse duty to report
lawyer misconduct where disclosure would reveal client "secrets"); MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(a) (1983) (prohibiting an attorney from revealing any information relat-
ing to representation of a client, whether or not such information is privileged).
13. See A.B.A. COMM. ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, REPORT TO THE
HOUSE OF DELEGATES 7 (February, 1990) ("There could be few things more destructive of [the
expectation of trust and confidence] than the spectacle of [the client's] own attorney forced by their
adversary to supply information detrimental to their interest."). See also In re Grand Jury Investi-
gation (Sturgis), 412 F. Supp. 943, 946 (E.D. Pa. 1976) ("The very presence of the attorney in the
grand jury room. . . can raise doubts in the client's mind as to his lawyer's unfettered devotion to
the client's interests and thus impair or at least impinge upon the attorney-client relationship.").
14. See N.Y. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 5-102(B) (If lawyer must testify
adversely to his client, the lawyer and his firm must withdraw from acting as an advocate before the
tribunal); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 3.7(a) (Rules provision corre-
sponding to DR 5-102(B)). See also In re Grand Jury Investigation (Sturgis), 412 F. Supp. at 945-
46 ("The practice permits the government by unilateral action to create the possibility of a conflict
of interest between the attorney and client, which may lead to a suspect's being denied his choice of
counsel by disqualification.").
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Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers responding said that they would
no longer take a major criminal case due to their fear of receiving a subpoena
for client information and having to face such a serious ethical dilemma. 15
For all these reasons beyond those based in the evidentiary privilege, a few
courts have imposed limitations on the issuance of subpoenas upon attorneys
for client information; even if the information is not privileged, these courts
are cognizant of the damaging effect such subpoenas may have upon the at-
torney-client relationship.1 6 Also, the Attorney Subpoena Guidelines of the
Department of Justice permit a subpoena to an attorney for client informa-
tion to be issued only if the information is not accessible from other sources,
and the need for the evidence outweighs the potential harm to the attorney-
client relationship.17 A problem with the Guidelines, however, is that they
are not enforceable by a court if they are violated.18
In New York, the Appellate Divisions have recently rejected a proposal
from the State Bar House of Delegates which would have amended the New
York Code of Professional Responsibility to address the problem of subpoena-
ing attorneys for client information. The proposed amendment would have
required a prosecutor to obtain a court order upon a showing of substantial
need before demanding information from a defense attorney.19 A similar
provision has recently been passed by the A.B.A. House of Delegates, adding
a new paragraph (f) to Rule 3.8 of the A.B.A.'s Model Rules of Professional
Conduct. The new paragraph forbids the subpoena of a lawyer for client
information unless the information sought is essential to the successful com-
15. See Genego, Reports from the Field: Prosecutorial Practices Compromising Effective Criminal
Defense, CHAMPION, May, 1986, at 7-18. See also In re Grand Jury Matters, 593 F. Supp. 103, 107
(D.N.H. 1984), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Hodes, 751 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1985) ("Also to be
considered is the ever increasing specter of malpractice suits, the possible vindictiveness of prosecu-
tion counsel towards a successful, recalcitrant, obnoxious or obfuscating adversary, the jeopardizing
of the attorney-client relationship, real or imaginary, the reluctance of capable attorneys to continue
or to consider a full or partial career in the practice of criminal law and the further depletion in the
paucity of capable trial lawyers because of a concatenation of events leading to abuse of process.").
16. See, e.g., In re Stewart, 156 A.D.2d 294, 548 N.Y.S.2d 679 (1st Dep't 1989) (enforcement of
subpoenas for fee information should be stayed until attorneys' representation of clients in current
matter is terminated; even though information is not privileged, a stay is necessary to limit "chilling
effect" on attorney-client relationship). But see In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Slotnick), 781 F.2d
238, 243-44 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied sub nom. Roe v. United States, 475 U.S. 1108 (1986) (court
order upon showing of substantial need is not required before serving subpoena on attorney for fee-
related information; attorney is entitled to no special treatment).
17. See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MANUAL, § 9-2.161 (prohibiting subpoena-
ing of jurors).
18. In re Klein, 776 F.2d 628, 635 (7th Cir. 1985). See also In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 906
F.2d 1485, 1496 (10th Cir. 1990) (violation of Department of Justice Guidelines creates no cause of
action and does not affect the validity of a subpoena: "They may enable the Department to control
those in the field, but once an agent of the Department acts, the legal status of that act depends on
other rules of law.").
19. See Proposed DR 7-103(C), N.Y. STATE B. ASS'N, DRAFT OF THE LAWYER'S CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (Oct. 5, 1987).
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pletion of an ongoing investigation, and there is no alternative source for the
information. The A.B.A. provision further requires the prosecutor to obtain
judicial approval of a subpoena after an opportunity for an adversary
hearing.20
The provision proposed by the New York State Bar and adopted by the
A.B.A. is undoubtedly controversial in light of the position of the federal
circuit courts in cases such as In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served upon John
Doe.2 In Doe, the Second Circuit specifically rejected the proposition that
judicial approval and a showing of special need was required before a defense
attorney could be subpoenaed for fee-related information. However, Doe
does not at all preclude the imposition of discipline for failing to seek such
judicial approval.
The courts which have considered the propriety of subpoenaing defense
attorneys have generally done so in the context of a Sixth Amendment chal-
lenge: the client argues that the possible disqualification of counsel under the
attorney-witness rule deprives the client of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel of choice. In Doe, the Second Circuit held that neither the Sixth
Amendment nor the attorney-client privilege were violated when the defense
attorney was subpoenaed to give fee-related information before the grand
jury. The court in Doe reasoned that the client's Sixth Amendment right to
counsel was not implicated by a grand jury subpoena since that right does
not attach until the defendant has been indicted.22 This has been a virtually
unanimous opinion in the federal circuit courts. 23
Even after an indictment, a subpoena of a defense attorney may be upheld
as a constitutional matter, despite the fact that it may result in disqualifica-
tion of counsel. This is because the right to chosen counsel is qualified by
legitimate state interests; and one such interest is that of investigating and
20. 58 U.S.L.W. 2476 (Feb. 20, 1990). Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Tennessee, and Virginia
have already adopted ethical prohibitions similar to that found in new Model Rule 3.8 (f). See, e.g.,
MASS. Sup. JuD. CT. R. 3:08 PF 15 (requiring judicial approval before issuing subpoena for client
information). Similar rules are being considered by the District of Columbia, Pennsylvania and
Rhode Island. Illinois and New York have rejected the imposition of any ethical limitation upon a
prosecutor seeking client information from a defense attorney. See A.B.A. COMM. ON ETHICS AND
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES (Feb. 1990) for the text
of new Model Rule 3.8 (f) and a discussion of state activity on this matter.
21. 781 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied sub nor. Roe v. United States, 475 U.S. 1108
(1986).
22. 781 F.2d at 244. See also In re Grand Jury Proceedings, (Rabin), 896 F.2d at 1277 (Sixth
Amendment controversy not ripe before indictment); United States v. Sims, 845 F.2d 1564, 1569
(11 th Cir.) (Sixth Amendment does not require the government to make a preliminary showing of
relevance and need before a lawyer can be compelled to appear before a grand jury), cert. denied,
488 U.S. 957 (1988); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 906 F.2d 1485, 1493 (10th Cir. 1990) ("We agree
with these circuits that no sixth amendment rights attach prior to indictment or after all appeals
have been exhausted.").
23. See 906 F.2d at 1493.
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prosecuting crime or fraud.24 While the client's right to some counsel is ab-
solute, the absolute right to counsel is not implicated when a particular attor-
ney is disqualified, since the client still has the right to retain a different
counsel. 25 Thus, the only practical limitation imposed by the Sixth Amend-
ment is that the government cannot subpoena a defense attorney post-indict-
ment, if the only purpose of the subpoena is to cause a disqualification or to
harass and intimidate defense counsel. 26 Ordinarily the government can
come up with a plausible explanation for the issuance of a subpoena, even
post-indictment. 27
Neither Doe nor any other case has held or could hold that a subpoena
served upon a defense attorney presents no threat to the attorney-client rela-
tionship. The fact that a subpoena upon a defense attorney is not prohibited
by the Constitution or by an evidentiary rule does not necessarily mean it is
ethical or good social policy. Of course, defense counsel does not violate his
24. See Doe, 781 F.2d at 251 ("courts have the power and duty to disqualify counsel where the
public interest in maintaining the integrity of the judicial system outweighs the accused's constitu-
tional right"); United States v. Perry, 857 F.2d 1346, 1350 (9th Cir. 1988) (no Sixth Amendment
violation where probative value of evidence outweighs the defendant's interest in retaining chosen
counsel); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 906 F.2d at 4193-94 ("The risk of disqualification should
remain for determination at an in limine hearing by the trial judge who must weigh the probative
value of the information the government seeks against the loss of counsel of the accused's choice.")
(quoting Doe, 781 F.2d at 250). See also United States v. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. 2657, 2666 (1989)
(right to chosen counsel is qualified by legitimate interests of the criminal justice system).
25. See Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988) (Sixth Amendment not violated where
chosen counsel is disqualified due to conflict of interest: "The Sixth Amendment right to choose
one's counsel is circumscribed in several important respects."). See generally Green, Through a
Glass Darkly: How the Court Sees Motions to Disqualify Criminal Defense Lawyers, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 1201 (1989) (criticizing the analysis and result in Wheat and suggesting that ethical standards
do not require disqualification where a client is to be cross-examined in the trial of another client).
26. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Matters, 751 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1984) (subpoena quashed where it
was issued right before trial in circumstances arguably for purposes of intimidating defense attor-
neys and interrupting their preparation for trial).
27. A prosecutor may not use the grand jury's subpoena power to gather evidence solely for use
in the trial of a pending indictment. See 8 J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 6.04[5].
However, a prosecutor serving a subpoena post-indictment will obviously articulate a legitimate
purpose-such as to investigate the client or the attorney on a further charge. Courts understanda-
bly hesitate to assume that a prosecutor's sole or principal purpose in issuing a subpoena is to gather
evidence for a pending trial. See Beverly v. United States, 468 F.2d 732, 743 (5th Cir. 1972) (sub-
poena of previously indicted witnesses proper where purpose is to identify co-conspirators). In the
absence of clear evidence to the contrary, the courts presume that a prosecutor has acted properly
in issuing a subpoena. In re Antitrust Grand Jury Investigation, 714 F.2d 347, 350 (4th Cir. 1983)
("Once it is shown that a subpoena might aid the grand jury in its investigation, it is generally
recognized that the subpoena should issue even though there is also the possibility that the prosecu-
tor will use it for some purpose other than obtaining evidence for the grand jury."). See also In re
Grand Jury Proceedings (Rabin), 896 F.2d at 1279 (no abuse of grand jury process where clients of
subpoenaed attorneys had not previously been indicted for tax evasion, and where prosecutor al-
leged that the primary purpose of the subpoena was to gather information relevant to grand jury's
investigation of tax evasion; while information was relevant to pending indictments, it was also
relevant to grand jury's ongoing investigation, and improper purpose could not be presumed).
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or her duty of confidentiality by complying with a court order.28 But the
propriety of a prosecutorial demand for the information is still open to ques-
tion. The constitutional analysis of Doe and like cases does not preclude the
adoption of a disciplinary rule such as already exists in Massachusetts, which
requires prosecutors to seek judicial approval before they subpoena defense
attorneys. 29
The court in Doe did state that the grand jury would be stopped "dead in
its tracks" by a limit upon the prosecutor's power to subpoena defense attor-
neys. But such a fear is overstated and unwarranted; any concern about
grand jury efficiency is clearly outweighed by the threat posed to the defense
attorney and the client by unrestrained use of the prosecutor's subpoena
power. 30
It has been contended that the Supremacy Clause would bar the applica-
tion to federal prosecutors of a rule such as proposed by the New York State
Bar. This argument was made in United States v. Klubock, but was rejected
on the ground that the Massachusetts rule had been incorporated as a local
rule of the federal district court.3 If that were not the case, the Supremacy
Clause issue would have been determinative in Klubock. But the existence
of a Supremacy Clause issue is hardly a reason for rejecting state-imposed
ethical limitations on intrusions into the attorney-client relationship. For
one thing, the Supremacy Clause argument is obviously not applicable to
state prosecutors. For another, adoption of a state-imposed ethical rule
would almost inevitably lead to its inclusion in the Rules of the District
Courts as well.3 2 And finally, it is not self-evident that the Supremacy Clause
would bar the application of state-imposed ethical limitations to federal pros-
ecutors at any rate.33 It is well established that the regulation of the legal
profession is a proper exercise of state power, and that power includes the
28. See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 906 F.2d at 1498 (Oklahoma Rule of Professional Conduct
1.6 not violated by compliance with court order).
29. See United States v. Klubock, 832 F.2d 664, 667 (1st Cir. 1987) (disciplinary rule limiting
subpoenas on attorneys, incorporated as local rule of court, upheld as a proper exercise of rulemak-
ing authority of federal court). See also Sheridan, Grand Jury Subpoenas to Criminal Defense Attor-
neys: Massachusetts Restrains the Federal Prosecutor Through an 'Ethical' Rule, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 485, 490-91 (1988) (balancing the right to counsel with society's interest in effective justice).
30. See 832 F.2d at 671 (concerns over prosecutorial abuse of subpoena power are not unwar-
ranted) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
31. 832 F.2d at 667.
32. For instance, the Court Rules of the Northern, Eastern and Southern Districts of New York
incorporate by reference all provisions of the New York Code of Professional Responsibility, and the
Rules of the Western District require familiarity with the Code, and impose sanctions parallel to
those imposed under State Bar rules. See, e.g., FED. LOCAL Cr. R. (S.D., E.D.N.Y.) RULE 4(F)
(incorporating provisions of N. Y Code of Professional Responsibility).
33. See United States v. Klubock, 639 F. Supp. at 122. (Disciplinary Rule identical to State Bar
proposal is not in conflict with any federal law, and is not inconsistent with any dominant federal
interest).
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authority to regulate the conduct of federal prosecutors insofar as it is not
inconsistent with federal law.
3 4
II. Two CATEGORIES OF INFORMATION: SUBSTANCE AND "INCIDENTS"
The decision in Hoopes v. Carota is exemplary of most courts' positions on
disclosure of the incidents of representation and communications by fiducia-
ries. In Hoopes, plaintiffs were beneficiaries of a trust which held stock in a
corporation that their family had founded. They brought an action against
the Chief Executive Officer of the corporation, who was also a member of its
board of directors and a trustee of the trust to which plaintiffs were benefi-
ciaries. The action was brought to remove defendant as a trustee, on the
ground that defendant had engaged in self-dealing and other misconduct,
both as a trustee and in his corporate capacity. The alleged misconduct in-
cluded promulgation of salary increases and long-term employment con-
tracts, and rejection of merger possibilities which were favorable to
shareholders and not to management.
During deposition, plaintiffs asked defendant whether he had consulted
attorneys as to any proposed sale, merger, or acquisition of the corporation;
if so, what advice was given; and whether he consulted the attorney in an
individual or a fiduciary capacity. Plaintiffs also asked defendant to disclose
any legal opinions he sought and received as a fiduciary, on any trust or
corporate matters. Finally, plaintiff asked for information about arrange-
ments for paying defendant's legal fees in the instant action. To all these
questions, defendant claimed the attorney-client privilege. The Appellate Di-
vision, Third Department, held that the privilege did not apply to any of the
information requested, 35 and the Court of Appeals affirmed that ruling in a
memorandum opinion.
The information requested in Hoopes can be usefully divided into two cate-
gories, and was so divided by the Third Department and the Court of Ap-
peals. First, the plaintiff wanted to know about the "incidents" of the
attorney-client relationship itself: was an attorney consulted? If so, in what
capacity (individual or fiduciary)? And how would the fees be paid-from
personal or corporate funds? The defendant in Fischetti was also asked to
provide the same type of information. There, the I.R.S. summons to compel
disclosure of the client's identity dealt with the "incidents" of the attorney-
client relationship.
Second, plaintiffs in Hoopes wanted to know about the substance of the
legal advice and communications that defendant received concerning the op-
34. See United States v. Kepros, 759 F.2d 961, 968 n.5 (lst Cir.) (applicable state rules of disci-
pline govern prosecutorial misconduct in federal courts), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 901 (1985).
35. Hoopes v. Carota, 142 A.D.2d 906, 531 N.Y.S.2d 407 408(1989).
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eration of the trust and the corporation. Different legal analysis applies to
these two categories of information; but a proper view of the privilege pro-
tects both categories of information for similar reasons.
INCIDENTS OF THE ATtORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP
The general rule in both the federal and state courts is that the incidents of
the attorney-client relationship are not covered by the privilege. 36 The privi-
lege protects only confidential communications made for the purpose of ob-
taining legal advice. The incidents of the relationship-whether an attorney
was consulted, the name of the client, and the fee arrangement-are not pro-
tected since they are not confidential communications. This proposition
stems from the widespread view that the attorney-client privilege is con-
cerned solely with assuring that the attorney is an effective adviser and
advocate. 37
The attorney's effectiveness is dependent on a free flow of information be-
tween attorney and client.38 This free flow could not occur if the client felt
inhibited from telling the attorney the truth. One of the leading exponents of
this "communication rationale" of the privilege is Judge Winter, author of
the oft-cited opinion of United States v. Shargel:
Absent the privilege... [l]awyers would routinely have to choose between
forgoing information indispensable to the provision of informed and com-
petent legal representation or hearing the information and exposing the cli-
ent to risk of subsequent disclosure to the adversary. 39
Under the communication rationale, the incidents of an attorney-client re-
lationship such as fact of representation, name of client, and fee arrangement
will almost never be privileged, since such information does not have an im-
pact on the attorney's effectiveness. It is only after an attorney-client rela-
tionship has been formed that there can be concern about whether an
attorney will be an effective advocate. Information such as identity of the
client and the fact and extent of representation is generally incidental and
36. Hoopes v. Carota, 74 N.Y.2d at 717, 543 N.E.2d at 74, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 409. See generally
Saltzburg, Communications Falling withing the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 IOWA L. REV. 811
(1981) (discussing the scope of the attorney-client privilege).
37. See generally Developments in the Law-Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV.
1451, 1515-24 (1985) [hereinafter Privileged Communications] (discussing the "effective advocate
concern" and the "incrimination concern" as two opposing rationales for the attorney-client
privilege).
38. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) ("The privilege recognizes that
sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon
the lawyer's being fully informed by the client.").
39. In re Shargel, 742 F.2d 61, 63 (2d Cir. 1984); see also 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEIN-
STEIN'S EVIDENCE 503(02) (1982) (the theory of the privilege is that encouraging clients to make
the fullest disclosure to their attorneys enables attorneys to act more effectively).
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preparatory to the formation and maintenance of the relationship, and has
nothing to do with the free flow of information once that relationship has
been established. It is collateral to and preliminary to the confidential com-
munications themselves. 4°
Put another way, the focus of the privilege in most courts is on the infor-
mation the client will offer if he or she knows the communications will be
confidential. Communications respecting the formation and extent of the at-
torney-client relationship do not meet this standard. As Judge Winter stated
in Shargel:
Absent special circumstances, disclosure of the identity of the client and fee
information stand on a footing different from communications intended by
the client to explain a problem to a lawyer in order to obtain legal ad-
vice.... A general rule requiring disclosure of the fact of consultation does
not place attorneys in the professional dilemma of cautioning against dis-
closure and rendering perhaps ill-informed advice or learning all the details
and perhaps increasing the perils to the client of disclosure.41
A small minority of courts take a different view of the privilege. This view
emphasizes the client's need to seek legal representation to determine the
legality of a proposed or past course of conduct. Without the privilege, the
client faces a Hobson's choice: either go without legal services and be inade-
quately informed, or confer with an attorney and run the risk of incrimina-
tion through the attorney's disclosure.4 2  Instead of emphasizing the
attorney's role, this "incrimination rationale" focuses on encouraging the cli-
ent to seek representation. Courts following the incrimination rationale will
invoke the privilege when without it the risk of incrimination will deter the
client from seeking an attorney. 43 These courts recognize that the client's
fear of incrimination often preempts the lawyer's need to be an effective ad-
vocate; that is, if fearful clients never consult attorneys in the first place, the
effectiveness of attorneys' representation never becomes an issue.
40. See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas (Hirsch), 803 F.2d 493, 496 (9th Cir. 1986) ("The fact of
representation and the associated fee arrangement are preliminary, by their own nature, establishing
only the existence of the relation between client and counsel, and therefore, normally do not involve
the disclosure of any communication arising from that relation after it was created.").
41. 742 F.2d at 63. See also Tornay v. United States, 840 F.2d 1424, 1426 (9th Cir. 1988) (fee
information not privileged since it is not a communication necessary to further legal advice); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, 791 F.2d 663, 665 (8th Cir. 1986) (adopting the communication ration-
ale-client identity not privileged); United States v. Ricks, 776 F.2d 455, 465 (4th Cir. 1985) (fol-
lowing the communication rationale-fee information not privileged).
42. See generally Kaplow & Shavell, Legal Advice About Information to Present in Litigation: Its
Effects and Social Desirability, 102 HARV. L. REV. 567 (1989) (examining the effects of legal advice
on client behavior).
43. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Pavlick), 663 F.2d 1057, 1060 (5th Cir. 1981) (identity of
client privileged where it is incriminating, since the privilege exists to encourage people to seek legal
advice freely), rev'd 680 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc).
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Courts such as that in Shargel do recognize that the communication ra-
tionale means that "the lack of a privilege against disclosure of the fact of an
attorney-client relationship may discourage some people from seeking legal
advice at all."44 Yet this is not a valid reason to apply a privilege under the
predominant view.45
III. EXCEPTIONS UNDER THE INCRIMINATION AND
COMMUNICATION RATIONALES
Under either view of the privilege, it is the rare case in which the fact of
representation, identity of the client, or fees paid will be privileged. Under
the communication rationale, such facts are hardly ever confidential commu-
nications which further the effectiveness of the attorney. Under the incrimi-
nation rationale, such information is ordinarily not incriminating or
damaging, at least not at the time of consultation.
However, the exceptions to the rule of nonprivilege are much broader
under the incrimination rationale than under the communication rationale.
Under the incrimination rationale, the facts concerning the attorney-client
relationship will be privileged if disclosure of such information will implicate
the client in the very matter for which he sought legal advice." If this is so,
there is a fair presumption that the client would be deterred from seeking
such advice if his name would be disclosed thereby. For example, in the
classic case where the attorney sends a check to the I.R.S. in payment of
back taxes on behalf of an unidentified client, the legal advice exception
would apply to shield the identity of the client, the payment of the fee, and
44. 742 F.2d at 63.
45. The incrimination rationale has been explicitly rejected by most courts, including the Ninth
Circuit, which had been its major proponent. See, e.g., Tornay v. United States, 840 F.2d at 1429.
See also In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 791 F.2d at 665 ("Nonprivileged information is not sud-
denly transformed into confidential communications, however, whenever it becomes relevant to a
criminal investigation or prosecution of a client.").
46. See United States v. Hodge & Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1353 (9th Cir. 1977) (such information
is privileged where disclosure "would implicate that client in the very criminal activity for which
legal advice was sought."). The "legal advice" exception has been disapproved in the Circuit which
promulgated it. The Ninth Circuit has rejected the incrimination rationale in favor of the commu-
nication rationale. See Tornay v. United States, 840 F.2d at 1428 (information concerning the
incidents of an attorney-client relationship is privileged only when it would reveal information that
is "tantamount to a confidential professional communication."). See also In re Grand Jury Subpoe-
nas (Hirsch), 803 F.2d at 496-97 ("Appellees argue that this case falls within an exception to the
general rule that the privilege does not apply, because disclosure of the fee-payer's identity would
implicate him in the very criminal activity for which legal advice was sought . . . However, the
relevant inquiry is not whether disclosure of the fee-payer's identity would be incriminating ... but
rather whether the requested information represents a confidential professional communication.").
Nonetheless, the "legal advice" exception of Hodge & Zweig has been followed by one other
circuit. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation (Durant), 723 F.2d 447, 451 (6th Cir. 1983) (citing
Hodge & Zweig for the "legal advice" exception).
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the fact of representation. 47 Under the incrimination rationale, if the inci-
dents of the attorney-client relationship are disclosed in this situation, the
client may never come to the lawyer in the first place. 48
Another example is where the government has traced a series of stolen
checks to a bank account maintained under a fictitious name. Out of that
bank account, a check has been drawn to an attorney in payment for legal
services. The government demands that the attorney disclose the name of
the client who paid him. If the client retained the attorney to represent him
in the matter of stolen checks, then the legal advice exception would apply
and the identity of the client and the fact of representation would be privi-
leged. In contrast, if the client sought the attorney's advice on any other
matter (e.g., a personal injury action or the drafting of a will) then the legal
advice exception would not apply, since disclosure as to one matter would
not have deterred the client from seeking legal advice on an unrelated
matter.49
A few cases have applied a so-called "last link" exception, prohibiting dis-
closure of the client's identity or fee arrangement if such information would
provide the last incriminating link in the chain of a criminal prosecution. 50
The "last link" exception has been properly criticized and rejected by most
federal courts, on two grounds: 1) it has nothing to do with protection of
privileged communications, since it would logically protect against disclosure
of any last link of incriminating information, whether or not it was a commu-
nication; 5' and 2) the exception is illogical in that it depends on the temporal
47. Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623, 635 (9th Cir. 1960).
48. Of course, application of the privilege in this example assumes that the attorney was retained
to give legal advice. If the attorney was retained solely as a conduit to send a check to the I.R.S.,
the privilege would not apply in any event. See In re Feldberg, 862 F.2d 622, 627 (7th Cir. 1988)
(privilege does not apply to communications made to attorney if he was employed solely to turn
over files to the government, since attorney would not be giving legal advice, but rather would be
acting as a file clerk). See also Capra, Attorney-Client Privilege (Part I), N.Y.L.J., Aug. It, 1989, at
7, col. 3 (discussing In re Feldberg).
49. In re Grand Jury Investigation (Durant), 723 F.2d at 454 (legal advice exception not applica-
ble where attorney fails to establish that disclosure of client's identity would implicate client in
matter for which legal advice was sought).
50. See United States v. Innella, 821 F.2d 1566, 1567 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) ("last link"
exception applies only to client's identity and fees, and not to other incriminating information that
forms the last link in a chain of evidence); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Pavlick), 680 F.2d at 1027
(articulating the "last link" exception).
51. See In re Grand Jury Investigation (Durant), 723 F.2d at 453-54 (specifically rejecting the
"last link" exception in favor of the "legal advice" exception); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 906
F.2d 1485, 1489-90 (10th Cir. 1990) ("the exception is simply not grounded upon the preservation
of confidential communications and hence not justifiable to support the attorney-client privilege.
Although the last link exception may promote concepts of fundamental fairness against self-incrimi-
nation, these concepts are not proper considerations to invoke the attorney-client privilege. Rather,
the focus of the inquiry is whether disclosure of the identity would adversely implicate the confiden-
tiality of communications.").
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sequence of events-thus it does not protect against disclosure of the "penul-
timate link" which may be every bit as damaging to the client as the "last
link." 52
Recently, both the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have recharacterized the
last link doctrine so that it is coextensive with the communication rationale
of the privilege. Under this recharacterization, the "last link" doctrine is not
concerned with whether the client's identity would constitute an incriminat-
ing last link, but with whether disclosure of the client's identity would reveal
her incriminating motive for seeking legal representation. Under this view,
the client's identity is protected only when it would reveal another privileged
communication. This is simply a restatement of the communication ration-
ale of the privilege. 53
Under the incrimination rationale it is possible that the information con-
cerning the incidents of the relationship would be protected in the fact situa-
tions of Hoopes and Fischetti. In Hoopes, the information sought concerned
legal consultation on the very trust and corporate matters at issue; therefore,
the incrimination view of the privilege would probably shield disclosure.
With an I.R.S. summons, the attorney would have to show that the client
consultation dealt with a matter that the government could be investigating
by way of the I.R.S. summons, and not some unrelated criminal or civil mat-
ter. If such a showing could be made, then the client's identity would be
privileged.
Of course, the I.R.S. could argue that its summons concerning Form 8300
information is not drafted to investigate any discrete matter on which a client
would already be consulting counsel. Rather, it is really a dragnet procedure
used to determine who should be subject to investigation for tax evasion,
money-laundering and drug activity. The legal advice exception seems ill-
suited to a case where the government has not even begun to investigate a
crime, since consultation could be incriminating. But the government could
52. See Privileged Communications, supra note 37, at 1523 (criticizing "last link" exception as
temporally based). But see In re Grand Jury Subpoena (DeGuerin), 724 F. Supp. 458, 464 (S.D.
Tex. 1989) (relying on "last link" exception to quash subpoenas seeking fee information, even
though such information under the facts is clearly not the last link in a chain of criminal
prosecution).
53. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena (De Guerin), 1990 U.S. App. Lexis 16613 (5th Cir. 1990)
("last link" doctrine is reconcilable with "the now-settled principle that the attorney-client privilege
shields the identity of a client or fee information only where revelation of such information would
disclose other privileged communications."); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Rabin), 896 F.2d 1267,
1271 (11th Cir. 1990), rehearing en banc granted 896 F.2d 1283.
The Eleventh Circuit will rehear Rabin en banc to determine whether the "last link" exception,
even as recharacterized, should ever be applied to fee arrangements when the client pays the attor-
ney in cash. 904 F.2d at 1498. The concurring judge in Rabin argued that the last link doctrine
was superfluous in light of the crime-fraud exception, which in his view would always apply when
the client paid an attorney's fee with large amounts of cash. 896 F.2d at 1281 (Tjoflat, C.J.,
concurring).
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end up using the information to incriminate on a matter different from that
for which advice was sought. For example, the client seeks legal counsel
because he may be involved in a murder, and pays a cash retainer of $20,000.
If the client knows that his identity would be disclosed, he may not seek legal
counsel. Yet, in this example, the legal advice exception would not protect
the client if the I.R.S. sought and used the information for evidence of
money-laundering or tax evasion.
The possibility of incrimination through consultation (and client reluc-
tance to consult in the absence of privilege) can exist whether or not the
government has focused on a particular crime at the time the client sees an
attorney, or chooses to investigate a different crime thereafter. Thus, the
legal advice exception is too narrow to cover all situations in which the privi-
lege is implicated under the incrimination rationale. A more appropriate ex-
ception would be to say the incidents of the representation are privileged
whenever a client would reasonably think that consulting an attorney could
be damaging evidence as to any crime, charge, or matter. Under this view,
the privilege would apply to consultation concerning one matter even if the
adversary sought the information as relevant to another matter.
The exception to the rule of no privilege is much narrower under the pre-
dominant communication rationale. The communication rationale is not
concerned with whether the client will seek legal advice in the first place, but
rather with the free-flowing nature of the communications once such advice
is sought. Under this view, the incidents of an attorney-client relationship
are not privileged, even though damaging or incriminating, unless in the con-
text of the case such information in fact reveals a privileged
communication. 54
An example of the limited nature of this exception occurs in In re
Shargel.55 There, the government subpoenaed a noted criminal defense at-
torney to produce records of money or property transferred to him by certain
individuals suspected of or indicted for violations of RICO. The government
sought the information as evidence of unexplained wealth, tax law violations,
and payment of legal fees by co-conspirators.5 6 The defense attorney argued
54. See, e.g., In re Witnesses Before the Special March, 1980 Grand Jury, 729 F.2d 489, 494-95
(7th Cir. 1984) ("The fact that the information is incriminating may provide all parties with their
motives to seek its disclosure or protection; however, the application of the privilege turns not upon
incrimination per se but upon whether disclosure would in effect reveal information which has been
confidentially communicated.").
55. 742 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1984).
56. It should be noted that even if the incidents of the relationship could be privileged, the privi-
lege would not apply if the fees were paid in furtherance of the crime or fraud (such as money-
laundering), or if the person who paid the fees was not seeking legal advice for himself. Eg., Priest
v. Hennessy, 51 N.Y.2d 62, 69-70, 409 N.E.2d 983, 987, 431 N.Y.S.2d 511, 515 (1980) (benefactor
who pays attorney fees for another client is not thereby seeking legal advice for himself). See
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that the fact of consultation was privileged, because it would indicate that the
clients were involved in criminal activity. The attorney further argued that
an incriminating inference of conspiratorial activity would be drawn from
the fact that each client consulted him shortly after the events underlying the
RICO indictment.
The Second Circuit in Shargel admitted that if the privilege were not ap-
plied to the incidents of representation, which implicated the client in the
very matter for which legal advice was sought, then clients may not seek
such legal advice in the first place. 57 However, this consideration is not rele-
vant under the communication rationale of the privilege. This view of the
privilege is concerned with the attorney giving well-informed advice, and not
about his inability to give any advice at all when he is not consulted in the
first place.58 The only question is whether disclosure of such information, in
the context of the case, is tantamount to a disclosure of a privileged
communication. 59
The Shargel court rejected the proposition that merely consulting an attor-
ney, even a noted criminal defense attorney, was tantamount to a confidential
communication. According to the court, no legitimate inference could be
derived from the fact of consultation, or the payment of a fee, or the disclo-
sure of the client's identity. 60 Even though the consultations occurred
shortly after the events underlying the RICO proceeding, the court con-
generally E. EPSTEIN & M. MARTIN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK-PROD-
UCT DOCTRINE 13-23 (2d ed. 1989) (discussing the communication element of the privilege).
57. 742 F.2d at 63 ("To be sure, the fact of consulation and the payment of a fee may be precon-
ditions to seeking legal advice, and we would be less than candid not to concede that the lack of a
privilege against disclosure of the fact of an attorney-client relationship may discourage some per-
sons from seeking legal advice at all.").
58. Id. ("Nevertheless, a general rule requiring disclosure of the fact of consultation does not
place attorneys in the professional dilemma of cautioning against disclosure and rendering perhaps
ill-informed advice or learning all the details and perhaps increasing the perils to the client of
disclosure.")
59. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas (Hirsch), 803 F.2d at 496-97 ("the relevant inquiry is not
whether disclosure of the fee-payer's identity would be incriminating ... but rather, whether the
requested information represents a confidential professional communication.").
60. The Seventh Circuit reached a result apparently contrary to Shargel in In re Grand Jury
Proceeding (Cherney), 898 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1990). The Cherney court, applying the communica-
tion rationale, held that where disclosure of the client's identity would reveal the client's motive for
seeking representation, the identity is shielded by the privilege. The court reasoned that a client's
motive for seeking legal advice is itself a confidential communication. Id. at 568. That proposition
is subject to serious dispute, since the motive itself (independent of any specific communications
concerning the motive for seeking advice) is not a communication at all, and hence would not be
protected under the traditional Wigmorean view of the privilege, any more than the payment of a
fee is protected, apart from confidential communications concerning the fee. But if the Seventh
Circuit is right in its assertion that the bare motive for seeking legal advice is itself a confidential
communication, then the Second Circuit is apparently wrong in Shargel, since the fact of consulta-
tion at a suspicious time shows the motive of the client in seeking legal advice, which would be
protected even under the limited communication rationale.
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tended that no connection with that proceeding could be inferred from the
fact of consultation alone.6'
Even presuming that no incriminating inference can be derived from the
fact of consultation, which is questionable at best, it is unclear why the court
in Shargel was concerned with whether the consultation could connect the
client with the RICO proceeding. Under the communication rationale,
whether an incriminating inference can be drawn from the fact of consulta-
tion is irrelevant. The only question is whether the name of the client would
link that client to a confidential communication. 62
Under the facts of Shargel, no link to a confidential communication could
occur, since disclosure of the name of the client would not disclose any of the
privileged communications made during the consultation; it may be relevant
to the client's incriminatory motive for seeking legal advice, but it does not
result in a disclosure of any specific communication about the client's motive
or anything else. 63 Thus, the court in Shargel espoused the communication
rationale, but did not apply it correctly to the facts of the case. The court
was right for the wrong reasons.
The court in Shargel also held that the privilege does not protect the iden-
tity of a "benefactor" who pays the legal fees of another. Certainly this is
information from which an incriminating inference can be derived, and the
services of an attorney may' not be sought if disclosure is mandated. The
court stated, however, that,
An attorney's ability to give informed legal advice is not impaired by a rule
allowing disclosure of such payments.... Whatever legal result might flow
from application of the incrimination rationale, the view of the privilege we
adopt thus denies protection to evidence indicating payment of one per-
61. This holding in Shargel is inconsistent with a previous case in the Second Circuit, United
States v. LaFroscia, 485 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1973). In LaFroscia, a defendant had been found with
the name and address of an attorney in his wallet when he was arrested. The government brought
this out at trial as evidence of consciousness of guilt. The court held that the evidence could be
properly admitted as meeting the low standard of relevance: it tended to show that the defendant
was anticipating that he would need an attorney, and that tended to show a consciousness of guilt.
Id. at 459. What was held to create an incriminating inference in LaFroscia was held to create no
inference in Shargel.
62. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
63. Cf In re Grand Jury Proceeding (Cherney), 898 F.2d at 568 (applying the communication
rationale, the court held that where disclosure of the client's identity would reveal the client's mo-
tive for seeking representation, identity is shielded by the privilege; the court reasoned that a client's
motive for seeking legal advice is itself a confidential communication, even apart from any specific
communications concerning the motive). Most courts have held that the motive for seeking legal
advice (as opposed to actual communications concerning the motive) is not a communication pro-
tected by the privilege. See, e.g., Ramseur v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 865 F.2d 460, 467 (2d Cir.
1989) (fact that attorney was consulted with respect to treatment of employee is not privileged:
"Though the statements made to the attorney for the purpose of seeking legal advice and the advice
given by the attorney are normally protected by the privilege, the fact and date of the consultation
would not be privileged.").
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son's legal fees by another.64
Under the communication rationale, when would the privilege apply to
such preliminary information as fact of consultation, identity of client, and
payment of fees? The court in Shargel gave as an example a group consulta-
tion. According to the court, an inference of confidential communications
indicating concerted activity of several clients might be drawn if they all saw
the attorney at the same time.
Yet it is unclear why a group consultation would create an inference of
confidential communications whereas (as the court held in Shargel) a series
of individual consultations around the same suspicious time would not. If
the distinction is that the inference from a group consultation is stronger
than an inference from a series of individual consultations, that sounds like a
reference to the incrimination rationale-one situation is more incriminating
than the other. The court in Shargel thus does not clearly delineate the ex-
ception to the general rule. The unpersuasive delineation of the exception
indicates that the Second Circuit will be loathe to find that the exception ever
exists. But it also indicates that the rule itself is not based on sound reason-
ing or persuasive application.
A better example of the exception to the rule of no privilege under the
communication rationale is the Third Circuit case of United States v. Lieb-
man.65 A group of attorneys gave tax advice concerning the purchase of
shares in a limited partnership. The attorneys charged a client for services
only after they arranged the sale of such shares to the client. The I.R.S chal-
lenged the attorneys' advice to their clients that the attorneys' fees were de-
ductible as a legal expense. The I.R.S. contended that the attorneys were
acting as brokers, whose fees are not deductible. The I.R.S. moved to dis-
cover the identity of the clients.
The court held that the identity of the clients was privileged under the
communication rationale. 66 The substance of the communication from the
attorney to the client was already known-the attorneys had told the clients
64. 742 F.2d at 64-65. See also United States v. Ricks, 776 F.2d 455, 465-66 (4th Cir. 1985) cert.
denied sub nom. King v. United States 480 U.S. 1009 (1986) (rejecting the legal advice exception,
and holding that fees paid by benefactors are not privileged); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas (Hirsch),
803 F.2d at 497 (fee arrangements and payments by benefactors are not privileged, since these
matters go only to the forming of an attorney-client relationship, and not to communications that
occur after the relationship arises; exception to the general rule exists not because such information
would be incriminating, but because disclosure would convey the substance of a confidential com-
munication); United National Records, Inc. v. MCA, Inc., 106 F.R.D. 39, 40 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (the
privilege does not protect the relationship as a whole, only confidential communications necessary
to aid the attorney in giving effective representation; thus, the opponent can demand information
about whether an attorney was consulted, and about the duration and nature of legal services
rendered).
65. 742 F.2d 807 (3d Cir. 1984).
66. Id at 810.
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that their services were tax deductible, and the clients had presumably acted
on that advice and deducted the fees. The disclosure of the clients' identity
would thus be tantamount to disclosure of a privileged communication, since
it would itself connect the clients with the communication. As far as the
clients were concerned, the previous disclosure was meaningless so long as
they were unidentified, since it was not connected to them. However, if the
clients' identities were disclosed, then the previous disclosure would be very
meaningful; it would be at that point that the previous disclosure becomes a
disclosure of confidential communications as to the particular clients. Thus,
the disclosure of identity was in context tantamount to the disclosure of priv-
ileged information. 67 If the previous communication had not already been
disclosed, then the clients' identity would not have been privileged, since
there would then be no connection with or disclosure of a privileged commu-
nication. Thus, the Liebman exception is limited to those unique situations
where the adversary knows the communication but not the communicator.
The far more prevalent situation where identity is undisclosed is that the
adversary knows neither the communication nor the communicator.
Under a proper application of the communication rationale, the I.R.S.
summons in Fischetti clearly does not seek privileged information, since the
client's identity is only an incident of the relationship. The fact that disclo-
sure may tend to incriminate the client as having sought advice from a noted
criminal defense firm, or as having paid a large sum of money in cash, may
be relevant under the incrimination rationale, but is not relevant under the
predominant view. Nor has there been a prior disclosure of a privileged com-
munication which could be connected with the client if his identity is dis-
closed. The government knows neither the communicator nor any
communication.6 Even under the faulty application of the communication
rationale in Shargel, the client's identity is subject to disclosure, since no
legitimate inference can be derived from the fact of consultation or the pay-
ment of a fee.69
The state courts have also been reluctant to protect the incidents of the
attorney-client relationship. A leading case applying an exception to the gen-
67. See also Dole v. Milonas, 889 F.2d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1989) (name of client is not privileged
"unless disclosure of the client's identity would be tantamount to a disclosure of a confidential
communication.").
68. In his oral ruling in Fischetti, Judge Broderick relied on Liebman in finding that disclosure of
a client's identity on a Form 8300 did not disclose the essence of another confidential communica-
tion. See Brodsky, supra note 10, at 4, col. 4.
69. It should be noted, however, that even under the communication rationale, the terms of a fee
agreement may be privileged because it may reveal confidential communications. See In re Grand
Jury Witnesses, 695 F.2d 359, 362 (9th Cir. 1982) (remanding to district court to determine whether
fee contract contained confidential communications). See also In re Witnesses Before the Special
March, 1980 Grand Jury, 729 F.2d 489, 495 (remanding to district court for determination of
whether privilege applied to certain information in billing sheets).
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eral rule that such matters are not privileged, is the New York Court of
Appeals decision in Matter of Kaplan.70 There, a client gave the lawyer in-
formation which the lawyer turned over to the New York City Commis-
sioner of Investigation. The information concerned bribery of city officials,
which the Commissioner was investigating. The client was not involved in
the bribery, but witnessed certain conditions which created an inference that
certain city officials had been paid off. It was established that the client came
to the attorney in secret, for fear of reprisals. The Commissioner of Investi-
gation sought to compel the attorney to disclose the client's name.
The court in Kaplan held that the name of the client was privileged, as an
exception to the general rule. The court stated:
Usually, it is not the client's name but the client's communication to his
lawyer which is held to be sacred, and so, ordinarily, there is no need to
conceal the name to preserve the confidence. But here the client's commu-
nication had already been divulged to the Commissioner and it was the
client's name that deserved and needed protection.71
Kaplan is thus a straightforward application of the communication ration-
ale, much like Liebman. The substance of the privileged communication was
already known; disclosure of the client's name would connect him to that
communication; therefore disclosure of the name was tantamount to disclo-
sure of a privileged communication by this particular client.72 Of course, the
broader incrimination rationale would also protect the client's name in the
Kaplan situation: if the name could not be kept secret, the client may not
have gone to the attorney in the first place.
In another leading case, Priest v. Hennessy,73 attorneys refused to tell the
grand jury the identity of parties who paid fees to the attorneys for represent-
ing clients charged with prostitution. The attorneys claimed that the fee ar-
rangements were shielded due to the privilege surrounding the relationship
70. 8 N.Y.2d 214, 168 N.E.2d 660, 203 N.Y.S.2d 836 (1960).
71. 8 N.Y.2d at 218, 168 N.E.2d at 661, 203 N.Y.S.2d at 839. Kaplan is referred to in Saltzburg,
supra note 36, at 821.
72. In In re Jacqueline F., 47 N.Y.2d 215, 391 N.E.2d 967, 417 N.Y.S.2d 884 (1979), the Court
of Appeals seemed to expand the Kaplan exception by stating that the incidents of an attorney-
client relationship-in this case the address of a client-would be protected from disclosure unless
the client would anticipate that disclosure would have to occur in the ordinary course of litigation.
Id. at 220-21, 391 N.E.2d at 970-71, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 887-88. Under this rationale, the client's
name and all other preliminary factors would be protected in non-litigation situations, which is a
view considerably broader than that taken by most federal courts, and which is broader than the
language and rationale of Kaplan. Ultimately, however, the court held that even if the address were
privileged, the privilege would not apply where the client was hiding behind the privilege in order to
frustrate an outstanding order of a court. Thus, Jacqueline F. does not in the final analysis expand
protection of the incidents of an attorney-client relationship. See generally E. FISCH, FISCH ON
NEW YORK EVIDENCE, § 521 (2d ed. 1977 and Supp. 1988) (discussing privilege as it applies to
name and address of client).
73. 51 N.Y.2d 62, 409 N.E.2d 983, 431 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1980).
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between the attorneys and the women they represented; and further that the
information was protected due to the independent attorney-client relation-
ship that the attorneys had with the alleged "benefactors." The New York
Court of Appeals rejected both claims, stating: "A communication concern-
ing the fee to be paid has no direct relevance to the legal advice to be given. It
is a collateral matter which, unlike communications which relate to the sub-
ject matter of the attorney's professional employment, is not privileged." '74
According to the court, the rule does not change where the benefactor is a
client who is paying for the legal fees of another. Since the privilege does not
protect the payment of one's own fees, it obviously does not protect the pay-
ment of the fees of another client.75
Like Kaplan, Hennessy is a straightforward application of the communica-
tion rationale. The payment of a fee is a preliminary matter. It does not
have an impact on the role of the attorney as an effective advocate, since that
role begins only after the relationship has been formed. While the threat of
disclosure may deter the client from seeking legal advice in the first place,
this factor is irrelevant to the communication rationale.
Under the broader incrimination rationale, however, the result in Hen-
nessy would be different. Assuming that the benefactor was seeking legal
advice, (as opposed to merely obtaining the attorney's services for another)
disclosure of the fee arrangement would be prohibited since it would impli-
cate the client in the very matter for which legal advice was sought.76
Applying the communication rationale to the information sought in
Hoopes v. Carota, the New York Court of Appeals correctly held that the
information concerning the fact of representation and the nature of the fee
arrangement was not privileged. For all that was shown, such information
was preparatory to the attorney-client relationship, and did not impact on
the effectiveness of the attorney once the relationship had been established.
There was no indication that disclosure of this preliminary information
would connect the client with previously disclosed confidential information,
as in Kaplan. The party invoking the privilege has the burden of establishing
that it applies. 77 The defendant in Hoopes made no showing that disclosing
74. 51 N.Y.2d at 69, 409 N.E.2d at 986-87, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 515.
75. Moreover, the payment of the fee of another is not a communication seeking legal advice for
the client. Id. at 69-70, 409 N.E.2d at 987, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 515.
76. See United States v. Hodge & Zweig, 548 F.2d at 1353 (under the incrimination rationale, the
privilege applies to the payment of fees by a benefactor since disclosure would implicate him in the
very matter for which legal advice was sought; however, information was not protected since gov-
ernment established prima facie case that fees were paid to further crime or fraud); United States v.
Lawson, 600 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1979) (applying the incrimination rationale, the court held that the
identity of a client who had arranged to pay the legal fees for two conspirators was protected by the
privilege). The Ninth Circuit no longer follows the incrimination rationale, and has limited Hodge
& Zweig and Lawson to their facts. See Tornay v. United States, 840 F.2d at 1428.
77. Priest v. Hennessy, 51 N.Y.2d at 69, 409 N.E.2d at 986, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 514.
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the information would connect him with a previously disclosed confidential
communication. The courts are willing to accept the consequence that the
client may not seek out representation in the first place if there is no privilege
for the incidents of the attorney-client relationship.
When a party invokes the privilege with respect to the incidents of the
attorney-client relationship, the true concern of the courts is that such a
party may be trying to shield corrupt and fraudulent activity. The presumed
scenario is that the client wants to keep himself or his fees secret because he
is consulting the attorney for aid in perpetrating a crime or fraud. Other-
wise, why be secretive about who you are or how you pay your attorney? As
one commentator stated: "One who reviews the cases in this area will be
struck with the prevailing flavor of chicanery and sharp practice pervading
most of the attempts to suppress the proof of professional employment. '78
As the basis for its opinion denying the privilege in Shargel, the Second Cir-
cuit stated:
It seems evident to us that a broad privilege against the disclosure of the
identity of clients and of fee information might easily become an immunity
for corrupt and criminal acts .... Such a shield would create unnecessary
but considerable temptations to use lawyers as conduits of information or
of commodities necessary to criminal schemes or as launderers of money. 79
IV. THE CRIME/FRAUD EXCEPTION
A broad rule denying the privilege to incidents of the relationship is, how-
ever, unnecessary to regulate the problem of crime or fraud. Any concern
that a client may seek to shield his identity or payment of fees for nefarious
purposes is already addressed under the fact-specific crime/fraud exception
to the privilege.80 Why is it necessary to address the same problem through a
broad rule that the privilege can never apply, and thereby risk deterring hon-
est clients from seeking counsel?
If the true concern is about crime and fraud, it is more reasonable, and less
costly to the attorney-client relationship, to regulate improper activity on a
case by case basis where evidence of crime or fraud is actually found.81 A
case by case approach is preferable to a categorical denial of protection to all
events surrounding the formation of the attorney-client relationship. Other-
wise, there is a considerable risk of deterring honest parties from seeking
representation in the first place. It is not always true that a client who wants
78. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 90 at 216-17 (3d ed. 1984).
79. In re Shargel, 742 F.2d at 64 (citing MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 90 (2d ed. 1972)).
80. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 798 F.2d 32, 34 (2d Cir. 1986) (exception to
privilege exists where party demanding information can make a prima facie case that communica-
tions to attorney were made in furtherance of a crime or fraud).
81. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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to remain anonymous is consulting an attorney for improper purposes. A
client may well have legitimate reasons for not wanting it known that he is
consulting a lawyer. For example, a battered spouse may with good reason
seek counsel secretly; so may a couple wanting to provide for an illegitimate
child.8 2 The same is true with fee payments. A client who pays for an attor-
ney's services in cash is not always using such a payment to further a crime
or fraud.83
It may be argued that it is difficult for the party seeking the information to
prove that the client consulted the attorney to further a crime or fraud, and
that therefore a broad rule denying the privilege to incidents of the attorney-
client relationship is necessary. This difficulty is overstated, however. In
United States v. Zolin,8 4 the Supreme Court recently held that under the
crime/fraud exception, the trial court could consider the challenged state-
ments themselves, in camera, to determine whether a crime or fraud was
afoot.85 The Court specifically stated that consideration of the statements
themselves was necessary, since otherwise a crime or fraud would be too diffi-
cult to prove.86 Moreover, the party seeking the information need only es-
82. See Seidelson, The Attorney-Client Privilege and Client's Constitutional Rights, 6 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 693, 709-10 (1978) (discussing reasons why honest clients would not want it known that they
were consulting an attorney).
83. But see In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Rabin), 896 F.2d at 1283 (Tjoflat, C.J., concurring)
("Simply by paying for services in cash, the defendants concealed relevant evidence, and such a
method of conducting a business transaction, standing alone, furthered the alleged misconduct. In
this case, therefore, the crime/fraud exception should apply to the communicative act of paying
fees.").
84. 108 S. Ct. 2619 (1989).
85. The Court in Zolin stated that a trial court could in its discretion conduct an in camera
review to determine whether there is a prima facie case of crime or fraud, so long as there is a
showing of "a factual basis adequate to support a good faith belief by a reasonable person." 109 S.
Ct. at 2631 (quoting Caldwell v. District Court, 644 P.2d 26, 33 (Colo. 1982)). The Court specifi-
cally rejected the extreme propositions that an in camera review was either absolutely prohibited or
absolutely mandated in every case. See 109 S. Ct. at 2627, 2629.
The in camera procedure is sometimes attacked as a denial of due process due to its ex parte
nature. The Court in Zolin noted that there is "reason to be concerned about the possible due
process implications of routine use of in camera proceedings." 108 S. Ct. at 2630. However, due
process challenges to in camera proceedings are ordinarily rejected due to the legitimate interests of
the government in maintaining the secrecy of grand jury materials, informant's identities, and the
like. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 884 F.2d 124, 126 (4th Cir. 1989) (in camera proceeding
appropriate to protect the government's interests in secrecy). But see In re Taylor, 567 F.2d 1183,
1187-89 (2d Cir. 1977) (in camera proceeding violates due process where government's interest in
secrecy was minimal because the government intended to disclose the same materials to the client
during questioning before the grand jury). See also In re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482, 490-91 (2d
Cir. 1982) (limiting Taylor to situations where government intends to disclose materials and thus
has no secrecy interest in materials submitted for in camera review).
86. 'No matter how light the burden of proof which confronts the party claiming the excep-
tion, there are many blatant abuses of privilege which cannot be substantiated by extrinsic
evidence. This is particularly true ... of... situations in which an alleged illegal proposal
is made in the context of a relationship which has an apparent legitimate end.' . . . A per
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tablish a prima facie case on crime or fraud to pierce the privilege.8 7
Given the crime/fraud exception, the adoption of a rule that the incidents
of representation are generally privileged would not be as costly as the courts
assume.88 In fact, the current general rule that such information is not privi-
leged is unnecessary, overbroad, and imposes an unreasonable impediment to
the citizen's access to legal advice and to justice. The limited cost of proving
crime or fraud on the facts is outweighed by the benefit that clients will not
se rule that the communications in question may never be considered creates, we feel, too
great an impediment to the proper functioning of the adversary process.
Zolin, 108 S. Ct. at 2629 (quoting Note, The Future Crime or Tort Exception to Communications
Privileges, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 730, 737 (1964). Significantly, the Ninth Circuit in Zolin, on remand
from the Supreme Court, found a prima facie case of fraud to exist when it was allowed to consider
the allegedly privileged statements themselves. It had not found a prima facie case when it had
considered only evidence independent from the statements. See United States v. Zolin, 905 F.2d
1344 (9th Cir. 1990).
87. Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 14 (1933) (finding that a juror may be required to reveal
role in deliberations upon a prima facie showing of jury misconduct); In re Sealed Case, 754 F.2d
395, 399 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("A prima facie violation is shown if it is established that the client was
engaged in or planning a criminal or fraudulent scheme when it sought the advice of counsel to
further the scheme . . . The government satisfies its burden of proof if it offers evidence that if
believed by the trier of fact would establish the elements of an ongoing or imminent crime or
fraud."); In re Antitrust Grand Jury, 805 F.2d 155, 166 (6th Cir. 1986) (rejecting directed verdict
standard as to stringent for establishing prima facie case); In re Feldberg, 862 F.2d 622, 625-26 (7th
Cir. 1988) (discussing conflict in circuits concerning appropriate definition of prima facie standard);
In re Grand Jury Investigation, 842 F.2d 1223 (1 1th Cir. 1987) (good faith statement by prosecutor
sufficient to establish prima facie case; opposition to grand jury subpoenas should not result in mini-
trials).
These ambiguities notwithstanding, it is clear that the prima facie standard is not an exacting one,
especially since the statements sought to be shielded can be considered by the court to determine
whether they were made with intent to further a crime or fraud. In Zolin, the Court noted that
there was "some confusion" in the lower courts concerning the application of the prima facie stan-
dard to the crime-fraud exception. 109 S. Ct. at 2626 n.7. The Zolin Court found it unnecessary to
decide the specific quantum of proof required to establish a prima facie case of crime or fraud, or
whether the proponent of the privilege should be allowed an opportunity to rebut a prima facie
showing. Id. at 2631.
88. Much of the argument by those who would limit the privilege is based on the assumption that
the privilege imposes a cost of denying access to reliable and probative information. See generally 8
J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2291 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) (discussing policy underlying the
privilege). In fact, it is questionable whether the privilege obstructs the truth-finding process at all.
The rationale of the privilege is that without it, a client would not be truthful to his attorney.
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (privilege exists to encourage the communi-
cation of relevant and truthful information to the attorney). The argument that the privilege ob-
structs the truth-finding process is based on the premise that the client would have made a truthful
statement to the attorney anyway (and that such a statement could be admitted if not for the privi-
lege). Yet this is the premise that is explicitly rejected in adopting the privilege. If not for the
privilege there would have been no truthful communication made in the first place. As one com-
mentator has stated, "[u]pholding an attorney-client privilege claim signifies only that what is cre-
ated through the privilege can be protected by it .... No tribunal is denied any evidence that it
definitely would have been able to obtain simply because the privilege is recognized." Saltzburg,
Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege in Shareholder Litigation and Similar Cases: Garner Revisited,
12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 817, 823 (1984).
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be deterred from seeking legal advice through a broad denial of the
privilege.8 9
To the extent that the broad rule denying the privilege is designed to ob-
tain information other than that indicating crime or fraud, it is submitted
that the benefits of obtaining that information are outweighed by the cost
imposed on society when citizens are deterred from seeking legal advice.90
The benefits of obtaining information other than that pertinent to crime or
fraud are speculative at best. Without the privilege, there may not be any
information to be obtained in the first place, since the client will be deterred
from seeking legal advice due to threat of disclosure. It can hardly be said
that the privilege is costly where it protects only such information as is cre-
ated in reliance upon the privilege.9'
The broad rule denying protection to the incidents of the attorney-client
relationship is inconsistent with the finely tuned balance of interests that is
found in the application of the crime-fraud exception. Under that exception,
the courts are careful to preserve the privilege when the client is seeking
advice concerning the legality of a prospective course of conduct. Where the
boundaries between legality and illegality are unclear, it is particularly neces-
sary for a layman to be able to seek legal advice, safe in the knowledge that
he will not be incriminated thereby; it is important that he obtain proper
advice so that he can conform his conduct to legal requirements. 92
The crime-fraud exception is carefully applied to cover only those situa-
tions where the client has sought the attorney in furtherance of a clearly
illegal or fraudulent act; it does not seek to prevent a person from obtaining
representation to determine whether a prospective course of conduct is law-
ful. 93 Thus the courts are committed under the crime-fraud exception to
89. Indeed, one jurist has stated that the crime/fraud exception is exceptionally easy to prove, if
not automatically shown, when the client pays for the attorney's services in large cash amounts. In
re Grand Jury Proceedings (Rabin), 896 F.2d at 1281 (Tjoflat, C.J., concurring).
90. Seidelson, supra note 84, at 712 (1978) (arguing that "imposing possible jeopardy on the
client who may be innocent... as the price to be paid for retaining counsel" is a "greater evil" than
excluding probative evidence of client consultation).
91. Saltzburg, supra note 90, at 823. (Attorney-client privilege "reaches communications that
are presumed to have been made precisely because the privilege exists. No tribunal is denied any
evidence that it definitely would have been able to obtain because the privilege is recognized. It is
not accurate, therefore, to say that the privilege operates in derogation of the search for truth.").
92. See, e.g., E. EPSTEIN & M. MARTIN, supra note 58, at 89 ("Society... has an interest in
protecting the confidences of a client who seeks advice about contemplated acts so that he can
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law; one could argue that the case for the privilege
is at its strongest in this situation.").
93. See, e.g., United States v. White, 887 F.2d 267, 272 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (no crime-fraud excep-
tion where client consults an attorney in order to determine whether a prospective course of con-
duct is lawful; it is inappropriate to deny the privilege in a situation where "even its stern critics
acknowledge that the justifications for the shield are the strongest-where a client seeks counsel's
advice to determine the legality of conduct before the client takes any action.").
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carefully delineate between the intent to exploit the privilege and the intent
to determine the legality of a course of conduct.94 As such, it makes no sense
to apply a broad rule denying the privilege to the client's identity and like
matters, which rule deters a client from seeking an attorney to do either good
or ill.
V. THE EXCEPTION FOR COMMUNICATIONS BY A FIDUCIARY
In Hoopes, the plaintiffs demanded more than just the facts surrounding
the defendant's attorney-client relationship. They demanded the substance
of communications between the defendant and the attorney concerning all
matters of trust and corporate business. Plaintiffs admitted that they were
demanding confidential communications that were made in the course of
seeking legal advice. Thus' the defendant had met his burden of showing
that the privilege applied in the first instance. Moreover, plaintiffs did not
claim (or did not have sufficient evidence to claim) that the communications
were made in furtherance of crime or fraud and thus subject to the crime-
fraud exception to the privilege. Rather, plaintiffs argued that since defend-
ant was acting in a fiduciary capacity in seeking the advice of the attorney,
the information was not privileged vis-a-vis the beneficiaries. Since he was
acting on their behalf, plaintiffs argued that it would be illogical, unreasona-
ble and unfair to shield the communications from the very parties who were
supposedly being served by the fiduciary.
The "fiduciary exception" to the privilege that was pressed by plaintiffs in
Hoopes originated in the famous Fifth Circuit case of Garner v.
Wolfinbarger.95 Garner was a derivative action in which the plaintiffs sought
access to confidential communications made between management and cor-
porate counsel. In Garner, the court found two competing principles at stake
when the shareholders in a derivative action seek access to confidential com-
munications from management to corporate attorneys. On the one hand,
management does not manage for itself, it manages for the shareholders; thus
it seems anomalous to deny the shareholders access to communications pre-
sumptively made on their behalf. Because of the fiduciary relationship, the
shareholders and management have a common interest; and communications
to an attorney are not shielded from one who is a joint client with a common
94. Id. (citing Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 42 at 597 (to behave desireably, clients must know
what sanctions will be imposed before choosing a course of action)); See also In re Doe, 551 F.2d
899, 902 (2d Cir. 1977) (privilege should apply where a "client has gone to his attorney in good
faith, seeking an opinion as to the legality of certain conduct in an area where legal boundaries may
be difficult for the layman to discern.").
95. 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971). The fiduciary exception has
come to be known as the Garner doctrine. See Quintel Corp, N.V., v. Citibank, N.A., 567 F. Supp.
1357, 1360-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (discussing "the line of cases that has developed from the doctrine
enunciated in Garner.").
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interest.96
On the other hand, if shareholders were given an unlimited right of access
on a mere showing of commonality of interest, management would be ex-
posed to harrassment suits, and an overall deterioration of corporate legal
representation might occur.97
To balance these competing considerations, the court in Garner held that
management had no absolute privilege to shield confidential communications
from the shareholders. If the shareholders could establish "good cause" for
access to the communications, then the privilege would not apply. The court
in Garner set forth a non-exclusive list of factors which would support a
finding of "good cause." The court did not state why the factors listed were
relevant to a showing of good cause, or whether some factors should be
weighed more heavily than others. Most of the good cause factors are prob-
lematic. 98 The most important of the good cause factors discussed in Garner
are:
1. The number of shareholders and the percentage of stock they represent.
After Garner, it has been held that derivative plaintiffs who represent single
digit percentages of shareholders are not entitled to pierce the privilege.9 9 It
is difficult to see why plaintiffs' ownerhip percentage is relevant, however. If
management manages for the shareholders, it manages for all the sharehold-
ers, so all should be equally entitled to the privileged communications. I°
2. Whether the shareholders were in good faith, and the colorability of the
96. See Ward v. Succession of Freeman, 854 F.2d 780, 784 (5th Cir. 1988) (Garner doctrine
based on mutuality of interest between fiduciary and beneficiaries, parallel to the "common inter-
est" or "joint representation" rule), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2064 (1989). See also United States v.
Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 243 (2d Cir. 1989) (discussing the "common interest" rule). See gener-
ally Capra, The Attorney-Client Privilege in Common Representations: Information-Pooling and
Problems of Professional Responsibility, 1989 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 20 (discussing the "common in-
terest" rule).
97. See Cohen v. Uniroyal, Inc., 80 F.R.D. 480, 483 (E.D.Pa. 1978) ("On the one hand, manage-
ment is under a legal obligation to serve the best interests of the corporation, and since the corpora-
tion is owned by its stockholders, it would seem anomalous to deny stockholders access to
information ostensibly gathered for their own ultimate benefit. On the other hand, the complete
removal of the attorney-client privilege from the grasp of the corporation client (based on the sup-
posed identity between a corporation and its stockholders) ... would expose corporations to harass-
ment suits by minority stockholders and a possible deterioration of candid attorney-client
communication and effective corporate management."). For a full discussion of the problems raised
in Garner, see E. EPSTEIN & M. MARTIN, supra note 58, at 82-88 (discussing the fiduciary excep-
tion in corporate litigation). For an extensive criticism of the Garner doctrine, see Saltzburg, supra
note 90, at 828-47 (1984).
98. See id. at 832-34 (demonstrating that the factors listed in Garner are of questionable
relevance).
99. E.g., Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Kaplan, 90 F.R.D. 21, 31-32 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (plaintiffs
representing less than one per cent of shareholders fall under Garner test to pierce privilege), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 943 (1982).
100. Saltzburg, supra note 90, at 832.
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shareholders' claim. These factors go more appropriately to the merits of the
derivative action than to whether a fiduciary can consult with an attorney
secure in the knowledge that his communications will remain private.
3. The shareholders' need for the information. Any party who tries to ob-
tain privileged information has need for the information, yet this need is ordi-
narily held irrelevant.' 0 The court in Garner makes no persuasive case for
why the shareholders' need should be treated differently from that of any
other litigant.
4. Whether the actions of the fiduciary were criminal, illegal but not crimi-
nal, or of doubtful legality. These are the concerns of the crime-fraud excep-
tion. The court in Garner was clearly concerned about crime and fraud, and
indeed analogized to the crime-fraud exception in establishing a special ex-
ception against fiduciaries. 102 Indeed, uncovering fraud seems to be the ma-
jor reason behind the Garner doctrine. 0 3 But the court in Garner makes no
case for why a separate exception is necessary to cover the very same prob-
lem covered by the crime-fraud exception. It appears that Garner was creat-
ing a hybrid-an exception by which shareholders could pierce the privilege
on a lesser showing of crime or fraud than would be required by other liti-
gants. I 4 But the court did not give fair consideration to the costs of such a
watered-down exception: that without the privilege, a fiduciary who simply
wants to determine how to discharge his duties to the beneficiaries will be
hesitant to seek counsel, and that the quality of the fiduciary's representation
will suffer thereby.
5. Whether the communications relate to past or prospective activity. The
court in Garner did not state which type of statement-one looking forward
or one looking backward-would make a stronger showing of good cause. It
could be argued that if the communication dealt with past activity, that
would lead to good cause since the fiduciary is no longer seeking to represent
the beneficiary, but is determining for his own good whether he has acted
properly. On the other hand, it could be argued that a communication as to
future activity would lead to good cause because of a presumed commonality
101. See Admiral Insurance Co. v. United States Dist. Ct., 881 F.2d 1486, 1495 (9th Cir. 1989)
(privilege is not pierced merely because information is unavailable from other sources: "Even as-
suming that the information plaintiffs need to establish their claims cannot be discovered from any
source other than the statement Gardner gave to Admiral's counsel, we decline to establish an
unavailability exception to the attorney-client privilege.... Such an exception either would destroy
the privilege or render it so tenuous and uncertain that it would be 'little better than no privilege at
all.'" (quoting Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981)).
102. See Garner, 430 F.2d at 1102-03 (crime-fraud and common interest exceptions are useful
analogies for an exception allowing shareholders to pierce the privilege).
103. See Privileged Communications, supra note 37, at 1528 ("When courts pierce the attorney-
client privilege in derivative actions, they are responding to legitimate pressure to exempt from
protection those communications that are intended to further future or ongoing fraud.").
104. Saltzburg, supra note 90, at 833.
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of interests as to future activity, and because of the concern over future crime
or fraud. The Garner court merely lists this factor without giving any gui-
dance as to how it should be weighed. 0 5 Further, the privilege itself protects
communications as to both past and future activity so long as no crime or
fraud is afoot. No reason is given in Garner for why such a distinction is
relevant in shareholder suits but not in all other suits. 0 6
6. Whether the advice concerns the instant litigation. Listing this as a good
cause factor is ominous. If the fiduciary sought counsel to defend himself in
an anticipated litigation with the beneficiary, communications made at that
point should be wholly outside the Garner doctrine. The fiduciary's commu-
nications to an attorney in preparation of litigation are clearly not made for
the benefit of the beneficiary. There is no commonality of interest that is at
the heart of Garner. Indeed, there is an adversity of interests. Accordingly,
courts after Garner have not pierced the privilege when the fiduciary com-
municates to the attorney in order to defend himself from the instant litiga-
tion. 07 While this is a sound result, it does not appear required by Garner.
Garner merely considers whether the fiduciary communicated in anticipation
of litigation to be one factor among many good cause factors, and does not
discuss the weight to which such factor is entitled. It therefore remains open
to deny the privilege to statements made by the fiduciary in anticipation of
litigation with the beneficiaries.
7. Whether the shareholders have made a particularized request or appear
to be engaged in a fishing expedition. 08 Yet if the fiduciary communicates to
an attorney on behalf of the beneficiaries, it is difficult to see why a benefici-
ary must make a particularized request. After all, the attorney is represent-
ing all beneficiaries, including those on a fishing expedition. Again, the court
in Garner gives no explanation for why its listed good cause factors are rele-
vant, given the doctrinal underpinnings of the fiduciary exception. The court
was clearly concerned with the possibility of harassment of fiduciaries, but
105. In In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595 (N.D. Tex. 1981) the court held that the client's
statement about past conduct could not be disclosed under Garner, since "[florced disclosure of
counsel's remedial advice would do great injury to the corporation's interest in self-investigation
and preparation for litigation." Id. at 608. While this is true, it is equally true that forced disclo-
sure of a statement concerning a future course of conduct would do great injury to the corporation's
interest in effectively managing the affairs of the corporation. Thus, Garner's distinction between
past and future conduct is unpersuasive. There is no meaningful distinction between past and fu-
ture conduct, either under the Garner doctrine or under the privilege in general.
106. Saltzburg, supra note 90, at 833.
107. See Privileged Communications, supra note 37, at 1526 (citing In re Sec. Litig. and Quintel
Corp., N. V v. Citibanc, N.A.). For similar reasons, the Garner doctrine has been held inapplicable
to the work-product rule. See In re Int'l Sys. & Controls Corp. Sec. Litig., 693 F.2d 1235, 1239 (5th
Cir. 1982) ("The work-product privilege is based on the existence of an adversarial relationship, not
the quasi-fiduciary relationship analogized to in Garner.").
108. See Garner, 430 F.2d at 1104 (distinguishing cases in which plaintiffs are on a fishing expe-
dition from those where plaintiffs have identified the sought-after communication).
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the rationale for its decision leaves no principled way to protect against such
harrassment.
Besides their questionable relevance, a mere glance at the good cause fac-
tors indicates that there will be uncertainty of application in many cases. 1°9
In any case, some factors will exist and others will not, and even a court that
is committed to applying the factors honestly will be hard-pressed to deter-
mine how to weigh the various coalescing factors. For example, what should
the court do if the shareholders have minimal holdings, but they have made a
colorable case and have established necessity? And what if the communica-
tions deal with a past course of conduct, though they were not made in antic-
ipation of litigation? Do some factors cross each other out? Are they
weighed equally? More troubling, the good cause factors are such that it
will be impossible to predict at the time of communication whether the privi-
lege will apply." 0 For instance, the fiduciary will never know in advance
whether the beneficiaries represent a large holding, or have a likelihood of
success or a strong need for the information. Yet for the privilege to be
valuable, it must be relatively certain of application, and a client must be able
to rely upon it with some degree of predictability. Otherwise clients and
attorneys will never be able to communicate with the assurance that the com-
munications will remain private, and the quality of representation will suffer.
As the Supreme Court has stated, a privilege of uncertain application is tan-
tamount to no privilege at all."'
Expansion and variations on Garner have occurred with respect to the
"good cause" requirements. Several courts have dispensed with the good
cause requirements entirely, especially in cases where an express trust-benefi-
ciary relationship has been created." 2 Other courts retain the good cause
requirement, but put the burden of establishing the lack of good cause on the
fiduciary; good cause is ordinarily a foregone conclusion in such circum-
stances, given the vagueness and malleability of the good cause factors." 3
109. See Shirvani v. Capital Investing Corp., 112 F.R.D. 389, 390 (D. Conn. 1986) (the "rather
vague" good cause exception "was ill-defined in origin and has been troublesome in application.").
110. See E. EPSTEIN & M. MARTIN, supra note 58, at 88 ("The balancing called for by the
Garner doctrine means that fiduciaries have no certainty that advice they seek regarding the fiduci-
ary relationship will be immune from discovery.").
11. Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981).
112. See, e.g., Helt v. Metro. Dist. Comm'n, 113 F.R.D. 7, 9 (D. Conn. 1986) (privilege does not
apply to communications between fiduciary and attorneys about fund held for beneficiaries); Dono-
van v. Fitzsimmons, 90 F.R.D. 583, 587-88 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (Garner doctrine does not work to
defeat the work-product doctrine).
113. See, e.g., Valente v. Pepsico, 68 F.R.D. 361, 369 (D. Del. 1975) (communications by attor-
ney for fiduciary are discoverable). Other courts more naturally impose the burden of showing
good cause on the party seeking the information. See, e.g., In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595,
607-08 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (class action plaintiffs unable to show good cause where benefits of protect-
ing privilege are apparent and sought-after communications are available from alternative sources).
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Still other courts have found good cause on the minimal showing of likeli-
hood of success and need for the information.' 14 Again, on these minimal
requirements, the finding of good cause is a foregone conclusion. In fact,
most of the cases applying Garner have found good cause on the facts, which
is not surprising given the vagueness of the factors.' 1
5
The Fifth Circuit, which begat Garner, has muddied the waters of good
cause even further, by holding that the good cause factors should be more
strictly applied when the unity of interest between fiduciary and beneficiary is
not as strong as in Garner. The court rejected the more rational approach
that Garner should not apply at all when the mutuality of interest is weak
such as in a tender offer to shareholders, where the corporate interest in con-
serving assets is adverse to the shareholder interest in maximizing the price.
Instead, the court held that Garner should apply but that the plaintiff has a
heavier burden in such cases of establishing good cause. 1 6 But adding a
vague "higher standard" to already vague "good cause" factors renders the
privilege all but meaningless: such a privilege obviously cannot be applied
with any certainty in advance.' 1
7
Contrary to the Fifth Circuit's anomalous "higher standard" approach, a
few courts have held that the Garner doctrine should not be expanded be-
yond the peculiar circumstances of a shareholder derivative action; these
courts reason that the Garner doctrine is spread thin when the action is not
brought on behalf of the corporation, but rather on behalf of individual
claimants who clearly have interests which are separate from that of the fidu-
ciary. Under the minority view, the mutuality of interest at the heart of
Garner does not exist outside the derivative suit. 118
Most courts, however, have applied the Garner doctrine wholeheartedly
and have extended it well beyond the derivative action, to any suit in which a
fiduciary relationship is shown. For instance, Garner has been applied to in-
dividual shareholder actions for fraud;' 19 to actions against majority share-
1 4. See, e.g., Quintel Corp., N.V. v. Citibank, N.A., 567 F. 1357, 1364 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (Garner
requirements met where sought-after communications are important to plaintiff's case and are not
readily available from another source).
115. Saltzburg, supra note 90, at 844-47 (discussing Donovan v. Fitzsimmons and Quintel Corp.,
N.V v. Citibank, N.A.).
116. See Ward v. Succession of Freeman, 854 F.2d at 786 (good cause not met in tender offer
situation where plaintiffs owned less than four per cent of corporation's stock, and did not attempt
to obtain the information from other sources).
117. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981) (vagueness of control group test
adopted by lower court makes prediction of when privilege applies impossible).
118. See, e.g., Weil v. Investment/Indicators Research & Management, 647 F.2d 18, 23 (9th Cir.
1981) (Garner doctrine limited to derivative suits).
119. In re Int'l Sys. & Controls Corp. Sec. Litig., 693 F.2d 1235, 1239 n.3 (5th Cir. 1982) (Gar-
ner factors apply to class action by former shareholders of corporation).
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holders owing a fiduciary duty to the minority; 120 to actions brought by
employees for breach of fiduciary duty owed by the trustee of a pension plan
under ERISA;12' to actions brought against a bank acting pursuant to a
power of attorney in a commercial land transaction;1 22 to actions against a
union and its officers brought by union members;1 23 to claims against an un-
secured creditors' committee brought by unsecured creditors;124 and to ac-
tions brought by beneficiaries against an executor of a will. t25 In these cases,
the term "fiduciary" becomes a device for an undifferentiated and unjustified
denial of the privilege to those properly seeking legal advice in order to deter-
mine how to best fulfil their duties. It is ironic that in order to ostensibly
protect beneficiaries, the Garner doctrine inhibits the fiduciary from seeking
advice as to how best to protect beneficiaries.
Where applicable, the Garner doctrine allows the beneficiary access to
communications made by the fiduciary in the course of representing the in-
terests of the beneficiary.' 26 But some courts have gone further and held that
the Garner doctrine applies even to communications made to determiie the
extent of the obligations owed by the fiduciary to the beneficiary. 127 Under
this broad view, a fiduciary cannot freely seek legal counsel to determine the
scope of his fiduciary obligations, a result which surely impairs the fiduci-
ary's effectiveness. 128 Some consolation can, however, be derived from the
fact that if the communications are made to prepare a defense against an
action by the beneficiary, the Garner doctrine has to date been
120. In re Transocean Tender Offer Sec. Litig., 78 F.R.D. 692, 696-97 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (majority
shareholders virtually concede that plaintiffs have established good cause to pierce the privilege).
121. Washington-Baltimore Newspaper Guild v. Washington Star Co., 543 F. Supp. 906, 909-10
(D.D.C. 1982) (employer cannot invoke privilege where sought-after communications came in
course of fiduciary relationship).
122. Quintel Corp., 567 F.Supp. 1357, 1363-64 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (Garner doctrine applies to com-
munication occurring during fiduciary relationship, but not to communications occurring before
relationship is begun or after it is terminated; Garner doctrine applies even to communications
made to determine the extent of the obligations owed by the fiduciary to the beneficiary).
123. Aguinaga v. John Morrell & Co., 112 F.R.D. 671, 679-81 (D. Kan. 1986) (privilege does not
protect communications between union officials and their attorneys).
124. In re Baldwin-United Corp., 38 B.R. 802, 805 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1984) (unsecured credi-
tors' committee has burden of showing good cause for failing to disclose privileged information to
its constituent creditors).
125. Estate of Torian v. Smith, 263 Ark. 304, 315, 564 S.W.2d 521, 526 (1978) (executor of will
cannot assert attorney-client privilege concerning advice given to him by an attorney, since executor
acts not for his own sake but in common interest with the beneficiaries).
126. See Note, The Shareholders' Derivative Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege, 48 J. LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 199, 215 (1985) (piercing privilege allows shareholders to use confidential
legal communications for the benefit of the corporation).
127. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
128. See generally Ward, The Attorney-Client Privilege: A Litigator's Perspective, 6 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 447 (1981) (discussing effect of Garner on corporate communications).
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inapplicable. 129
In Hoopes, neither the Third Department nor the Court of Appeals had
any problem applying the Garner doctrine to the particular fiduciary rela-
tionship at issue. As the Third Department stated:
"The salient factor on this issue is that defendant, both in his capacity as a
trustee and as a corporate officer and director, was the fiduciary of the
plaintiffs. In any of these roles, defendant was not entitled to shield abso-
lutely from his beneficiaries the communications between him and his at-
torneys regarding pertinent affairs of the trust and of the corporation
"130
Thus, Hoopes is a straightforward application of the mutuality of interest
principle that is at the heart of Garner.
The more difficult question in Hoopes was whether the plaintiffs would be
required to establish good cause before they received access to the fiduciary's
communications. Both the Third Department and the Court of Appeals
noted that there were cases on both sides of this issue, some requiring a
showing and some not. Both courts stated that the issue did not have to be
decided in Hoopes, since the plaintiffs had in any event established good
cause.
Hoopes is a classic example of the uselessness of the Garner good cause
factors. The Third Department had held that good cause had been found
because: the beneficiaries had an identity of interest; the plaintiffs "may have
been directly affected" by defendant's decisions which were based on his at-
torneys' advice; the plaintiffs had demonstrated a need for the evidence; the
communications related to prospective and not past actions; plaintiffs' claims
were colorable; and plaintiffs' request for information was specific.' 31 Upon
this minimal showing, the Third Department held that the burden was
shifted to defendant to show that the good cause requirements were not in
fact met.' 32 According to the court, defendant could satisfy that burden by,
for example, showing that he had consulted the attorney solely in an individ-
ual capacity. Presumably the burden could also be satisfied by attacking the
plaintiff's minimal showing on factual grounds. Defendant had not met his
burden. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Third Department in conclusory
fashion by agreeing that good cause was present.
Under the analysis in Hoopes, it is unimportant to determine whether the
Garner good cause factors must be met: they are met in virtually every case.
The plaintiffs did little more than establish the colorability of their claim and
129. See Privileged Communications, supra note 37, at 1526 (citing In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89
F.R.D. 595, 607-08 (N.D. Tex. 1981)).
130. 142 A.D.2d at 909, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 409.
131. Id. at 910, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 410.
132. Id.
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a need for the evidence. Then the burden shifted to the defendant to show
lack of good cause. The example given by the court in which that burden
would be met-that the defendant could show that he sought advice in a
purely individual capacity-is no example at all, since if he did seek advice in
an individual capacity, the Garner doctrine is by definition inapplicable.
There is no issue of good cause in such circumstances. Good cause is only
relevant where the fiduciary seeks advice in a fiduciary capacity. It is at that
point where the fiduciary needs the protection of the good cause factors, such
as they are. It is at that point where the courts in Hoopes deprived the fiduci-
ary of meaningful protection, given plaintiff's minimal showing and the shift-
ing of the burden to the defendant.
Hoopes is not a novel decision. It is merely indicative of the consequences
of virtual eradication of the privilege in fiduciary situations. The fiduciary
has a dilemma: he is subject to high standards of conduct, yet deterred from
receiving the guidance of counsel that is so necessary to meet those high
standards.
While Garner has received an expansive reading in most courts, including
the Court of Appeals in Hoopes, the Garner doctrine is in fact ill-considered
and unsupportable. 133 It is true that a fiduciary ostensibly acts on behalf of a
beneficiary; but that is no reason to destroy the opportunity of a fiduciary to
seek legal advice. Yet this is what occurs if the fiduciary cannot approach an
attorney safe in the knowledge that what he says will not come back to haunt
him. As one noted commentator has stated:
The word 'fiduciary' has no talismanic quality that dictates abdication of
the usual approach to attorney-client privilege whenever the word is in-
voked. Those who have fiduciary responsibility often want legal advice
concerning their responsibilities. They should have the same opportunity
to consult with counsel and to speak freely and without fear of making
admissions as any other clients. 134
The fact that fiduciaries have special duties of care is more and not less
reason to give them the opportunity to consult freely with counsel concern-
ing the performance of their duties. As a result of Garner, the fiduciary's
representation of the beneficiary may suffer in the long run, since the fiduci-
ary may find it preferable to go without legal advice. 135
133. See O'Neal & Thompson, Vulnerability of Professional-Client Privilege in Shareholder Liti-
gation, 31 Bus. LAW. 1775, 1782 (1976) (discussing difficulty in weighing Garner factors when they
do not all tip in the same direction).
134. Saltzburg, supra note 90, at 846.
135. See Shirvani v. Capital Investing Corp., 112 F.R.D. 389, 391 (D. Conn. 1986) ("Indeed, a
curtailment or confusion of traditional privilege concepts eventually may not lead to more endpoint
disclosure at all, but result instead in less open and candid attorney-client communication in the
first place.").
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It is no answer to say that the fiduciary is sufficiently protected by the
Garner good cause factors. There is no way for a fiduciary to predict at the
time of consulting an attorney whether such factors will apply. As discussed
above, the fiduciary could not know at the time of consultation whether the
beneficiary can establish sufficient need or a colorable claim, or the percent-
age of ownership that the future plaintiffs will have. Moreover, even if the
good cause factors could be predicted in advance, the courts have either ig-
nored them entirely or applied them without significant scrutiny.
Of course, the need for access by the beneficiaries is not to be lightly disre-
garded if the fiduciary is abusing his position. But the costly Garner doctrine
is overbroad in accomodating this need: if the fiduciary is consulting the
attorney to further a plan of crime or fraud, the communications will not be
privileged at any rate due to the crime-fraud exception.1 36 As one court has
stated:
Without sacrificing important public interests in maintaining open com-
munication between lawyer and client generally, shareholders do possess
adequate disclosure rights under long-established limits to the attorney-cli-
ent privilege in cases of demonstrable wrongdoing-i.e. the privilege excep-
tion recognized when there are "communications in furtherance of
contemplated or ongoing criminal or fraudulent conduct."'
37
The courts applying Garner admirably seek to regulate the fiduciary's at-
tempts to use an attorney for nefarious purposes. 38 Yet these courts inexpli-
cably fail to use the very test which was specifically designed to prevent the
use of the privilege where crime or fraud is afoot.' 39 Instead, they use an
overbroad exception to the privilege which may well apply even where the
fiduciary is properly seeking legal advice. As discussed above, the crime-
fraud exception is a well-balanced, case by case approach which prevents
clients from consulting with attorneys for improper purposes and yet allows
those with good intentions to unhesitatingly seek legal advice. And if the
client has crossed the crime-fraud line, it is not difficult to establish a prima
facie case of wrongdoing, since the trial court is allowed to consider the chal-
136. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 754 F.2d 395, 399 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (communications made in
furtherance of obstruction of justice are subject to disclosure under the crime-fraud exception to the
attorney-client privilege).
137. Shirvani v. Capital Investing Corp., 112 F.R.D. at 391 (quoting In re Grand Jury Subpoena
Duces Tecum, 731 F.2d 1032, 1038 (2d Cir. 1984)).
138. See Privileged Communications, supra note 37, at 1528 ("When courts pierce the attorney-
client privilege in derivative actions, they are responding to legitimate pressure to exempt from
protection those communications that are intended to further future or ongoing fraud.").
139. Indeed, a compelling case has been made that the crime-fraud exception was applicable to
the communications at issue in Garner itself, thus rendering the court's analysis completely unnec-
essary.' See Saltzburg, supra note 90, at 841-42 (asserting that the facts of Garner fell within the
crime-fraud exception to the privilege).
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lenged statements themselves on this issue.14°
In those cases where the beneficiary is unable to pierce the privilege
through the crime-fraud exception, the cost to the beneficiaries imposed by
the privilege is clearly outweighed by the benefits derived from allowing the
fiduciary to seek counsel to determine a presumptively legal course of activ-
ity. This is especially so since the "cost" to the beneficiaries is as illusory as
the cost of the privilege itself-if there is no privilege, then the fiduciary's
communications would probably not have been made in the first place. 14 1
Even if it can be argued that the privilege imposes a cost, and that the
beneficiary who cannot show crime or fraud nonetheless has some legitimate
interest in pursuing his case, rejection of the Garner doctrine would not im-
pose undue hardship on beneficiaries seeking to prove a case against a fiduci-
ary. Even in these cases, the Garner exception is not crucial for beneficiaries,
especially considering its cost. For one, the privilege attaches to communica-
tions only, and not to underlying facts.' 42 Thus, the fiduciary can be asked
what he did, but not what he said to his attorney. 43 Nor does the privilege
protect pre-existing documents that the fiduciary turned over to the attor-
ney.'" Also, a statement to the lawyer is not privileged if the fiduciary is
seeking business and not legal advice. 145 This is especially likely to occur in
the corporate context.146 Further, in the corporate context, the privilege is
140. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
142. See C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 6.3.5 at 257 (1986) (discussing content of
client communicative acts). See also In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Rabin), 896 F.2d at 1270
("[C]ourts have distinguished between underlying facts-facts existing independently of any com-
munication between the attorney and the client-and communications about those facts, extending
the privilege to the latter but not to the former.").
143. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395-96 (1981) (broad view of privilege does
not impose undue costs, since underlying facts can still be obtained); Stanwick v. A.R.A. Services,
Inc., 124 A.D.2d 1041, 1041-42, 508 N.Y.S.2d 755, 756 (4th Dep't 1986) (privilege extends to
communications and not to facts; subject matter of meeting is not privileged).
144. See, e.g., Gould, Inc. v. Mitsui Mining & Smelting Co., 825 F.2d 676, 679-680 (2d Cir.
1987) (documents which are not privileged in the hands of the client do not beome privileged
merely because they are turned over to the attorney).
145. United States v. Int'l Business Machines, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 206, 212-213 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
(test is whether the element of legal advice predominates; even legal advice may not be privileged if
it is only incidental to business advice). See generally E. EPSTEIN & M. MARTIN, supra note 58, at
36-40 (discussing the legal and non-legal aspects of attorneys' actions).
146. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Gulf& Western Indus., Inc. 518 F. Supp. 675, 683 (D.D.C. 1981) (com-
munications to corporate attorney were not privileged where he received information not as general
counsel but as a member of the Pensions Fund's investment committee: "Because of Dolkart's
many roles ... it cannot be assumed that all of his discussion with corporate officials involved legal
advice."); In re Feldberg, 582 F.2d 622, 626 (7th Cir. 1988) ("A business that gets marketing advice
from a lawyer does not acquire a privilege in the bargain; so too a business that obtains the services
of a records custodian from a member of the bar."); SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 70 F.R.D. 508, 515
(D. Conn. 1986) ("Legal departments are not citadels in which public, business or technical infor-
mation may be placed to defeat discovery and thereby insure confidentiality").
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held by the corporation, not by the corporate official. 147 If the official is sus-
pected of wrongdoing, the corporation may waive the privilege, and the offi-
cial may be disqualified from participating in the waiver decision. 148 Finally,
if the fiduciary relies upon an "advice of counsel" defense, as will often be the
case, the privilege is deemed waived. 149
VI. CONCLUSION
Given the minimal costs imposed on the beneficiary in any case, it is clear
that the Garner doctrine is overkill: the argument for a special rule provid-
ing undifferentiated protection to beneficiaries is especially weak given the
various modes of access that are well-established for all litigants. Applica-
tion of the crime-fraud exception results in a far better balance of competing
interests than does a blunderbuss application of the Garner doctrine.
The Garner doctrine is similar in intent to the rule holding that the inci-
dents of the attorney-client relationship are not privileged. Both rules are
concerned that the attorney-client relationship is being exploited for pur-
poses of wrongdoing. Yet both rules go beyond the traditional method used
to penetrate such wrongdoing: the crime-fraud exception. Both rules eschew
a well-established case by case approach and opt instead for an overbroad
and costly principle which deters an honest client from seeking legal counsel.
By establishing an all but categorical exception to the privilege, the Garner
doctrine, like the rule holding the relationship itself unprivileged, certainly
deters fraud; but it also deters legitimate communications from ever
occurring. 150
Federal and state courts generally deny a privilege to the incidents of the
attorney-client relationship and to the substance of the communications be-
tween a fiduciary and an attorney. In both situations, the courts are con-
cerned with exploitation of the attorney-client relationship for nefarious
purposes. Yet in both situations, the courts have gone too far. Given the
crime-fraud exception, it makes no sense to establish categorical rules abol-
ishing the privilege for fear of fraud; this is especially so when the conse-
147. See In re Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Management Corp., 805 F.2d 120, 124 (3rd Cir.
1986) ("Any privilege that exists as to a corporate officer's role and functions within a corporation
belongs to the corporation, not the officer.... A corporate official thus may not prevent a corpora-
tion from waiving its privilege arising from discussions with corporate counsel about corporate
matters.") (citing In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 391 F. Supp. at 1034).
148. See Kirby, New Life for the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege in Shareholder Litigation, 69
A.B.A. J. 174 (1983) (discussing perceived trend toward stronger and more predictable corporate
privilege).
149. See, e.g., Hollins v. Powell, 773 F.2d 191, 196 (8th Cir. 1985) (defense of relying on attor-
ney's advice in pursuing challenged course of conduct results in waiver of privilege).
150. See Privileged Communications, supra note 37, at 1515-24 (advocating rejection of both the
Garner doctrine and the rule holding that the incidents of the attorney-client relationship are un-
privileged, in favor of a case by case application of the crime-fraud exception).
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quence of denial is to deter the person from seeking legal advice in the first
place.
